Bayes, Bounds, and Rational Analysis
While Bayesian models have been applied to an impressive range of cognitive phenomena, methodological challenges have been leveled concerning their role in the program of rational analysis. The focus of the current article is on computational impediments to probabilistic inference and related puzzle...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Philosophy of science 2018-01, Vol.85 (1), p.79-101 |
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| container_end_page | 101 |
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| container_title | Philosophy of science |
| container_volume | 85 |
| creator | Icard, Thomas F. |
| description | While Bayesian models have been applied to an impressive range of cognitive phenomena, methodological challenges have been leveled concerning their role in the program of rational analysis. The focus of the current article is on computational impediments to probabilistic inference and related puzzles about empirical confirmation of these models. The proposal is to rethink the role of Bayesian methods in rational analysis, to adopt an independently motivated notion of rationality appropriate for computationally bounded agents, and to explore broad conditions under which (approximately) Bayesian agents would be rational. The proposal is illustrated with a characterization of costs inspired by thermodynamics. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/694837 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Philosophy of science, 2018-01, Vol.85 (1), p.79-101 |
| issn | 0031-8248 1539-767X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_crossref_primary_10_1086_694837 |
| source | JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Cambridge University Press Journals Complete |
| subjects | Bayesian analysis Cognitive ability Computer applications Empirical analysis Mathematical models Probabilistic inference Probability Rationality Thermodynamics |
| title | Bayes, Bounds, and Rational Analysis |
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