The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules
Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show the conditions under which the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in gen...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of legal studies 2005-01, Vol.34 (1), p.207-237 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 237 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 207 |
| container_title | The Journal of legal studies |
| container_volume | 34 |
| creator | Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe De Geest, Gerrit |
| description | Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show the conditions under which the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in general, preferred to rules that place the burden entirely on one party. Our analysis applies to loss sharing in tort liability, the allocation of police investigation efforts, contract remedies for nonverifiable breaches such as those that may occur in marriage and employment contracts, and the distribution of shares in partnerships. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/426853 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1086_426853</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>10.1086/426853</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>10.1086/426853</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c394t-88ee687ef611af9d7d3c0912e9a8d300d2fe3b4266f4b7f3190de5a430120e033</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpFkE1Lw0AURQdRMFb9BS6CqLvom3nzkSyltCoUBK3rME3etCmxiTPJov_eaKSuHlwO5z4uY5cc7jmk-kEKnSo8YhFXaBKFWh-zCECaRCiEU3YWwhYAuBQmYrfLDcXzqu7IV7t1PHOOii5uXPy-sb_JW19TOGcnztaBLv7uhH3MZ8vpc7J4fXqZPi6SAjPZJWlKpFNDTnNuXVaaEgvIuKDMpiUClMIRrob_tJMr45BnUJKyEoELIECcsOvR2_rmq6fQ5dum97uhMheoMpCo1QDdjVDhmxA8ubz11af1-5xD_rNAPi4wgDcj2BebqrDrpvUUwr_ygF2N2DZ0jT_Ihj4BaPAbqH1gOg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>235904365</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules</title><source>HeinOnline Law Journal Library</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>University of Chicago Press Journals (Full run)</source><creator>Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe ; De Geest, Gerrit</creator><creatorcontrib>Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe ; De Geest, Gerrit</creatorcontrib><description>Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show the conditions under which the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in general, preferred to rules that place the burden entirely on one party. Our analysis applies to loss sharing in tort liability, the allocation of police investigation efforts, contract remedies for nonverifiable breaches such as those that may occur in marriage and employment contracts, and the distribution of shares in partnerships.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0047-2530</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1537-5366</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1086/426853</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JLGSAO</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: The University of Chicago Press</publisher><subject>Accidents ; Comparative negligence ; Contract breaches ; Contracts ; Cost allocation ; Cost efficiency ; Law enforcement ; Liability ; Sharing ; Social costs ; Social welfare ; Torts ; Violations ; Welfare</subject><ispartof>The Journal of legal studies, 2005-01, Vol.34 (1), p.207-237</ispartof><rights>2005 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.</rights><rights>Copyright University of Chicago Law School Jan 2005</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c394t-88ee687ef611af9d7d3c0912e9a8d300d2fe3b4266f4b7f3190de5a430120e033</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c394t-88ee687ef611af9d7d3c0912e9a8d300d2fe3b4266f4b7f3190de5a430120e033</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086%2F426853$$EPDF$$P50$$Guchicagopress$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086%2F426853$$EHTML$$P50$$Guchicagopress$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,27924,27925,54019,54023</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>De Geest, Gerrit</creatorcontrib><title>The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules</title><title>The Journal of legal studies</title><description>Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show the conditions under which the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in general, preferred to rules that place the burden entirely on one party. Our analysis applies to loss sharing in tort liability, the allocation of police investigation efforts, contract remedies for nonverifiable breaches such as those that may occur in marriage and employment contracts, and the distribution of shares in partnerships.</description><subject>Accidents</subject><subject>Comparative negligence</subject><subject>Contract breaches</subject><subject>Contracts</subject><subject>Cost allocation</subject><subject>Cost efficiency</subject><subject>Law enforcement</subject><subject>Liability</subject><subject>Sharing</subject><subject>Social costs</subject><subject>Social welfare</subject><subject>Torts</subject><subject>Violations</subject><subject>Welfare</subject><issn>0047-2530</issn><issn>1537-5366</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2005</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNpFkE1Lw0AURQdRMFb9BS6CqLvom3nzkSyltCoUBK3rME3etCmxiTPJov_eaKSuHlwO5z4uY5cc7jmk-kEKnSo8YhFXaBKFWh-zCECaRCiEU3YWwhYAuBQmYrfLDcXzqu7IV7t1PHOOii5uXPy-sb_JW19TOGcnztaBLv7uhH3MZ8vpc7J4fXqZPi6SAjPZJWlKpFNDTnNuXVaaEgvIuKDMpiUClMIRrob_tJMr45BnUJKyEoELIECcsOvR2_rmq6fQ5dum97uhMheoMpCo1QDdjVDhmxA8ubz11af1-5xD_rNAPi4wgDcj2BebqrDrpvUUwr_ygF2N2DZ0jT_Ihj4BaPAbqH1gOg</recordid><startdate>200501</startdate><enddate>200501</enddate><creator>Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe</creator><creator>De Geest, Gerrit</creator><general>The University of Chicago Press</general><general>University of Chicago Law School</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>88F</scope><scope>8AM</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGRYB</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K7.</scope><scope>M0O</scope><scope>M1Q</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200501</creationdate><title>The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules</title><author>Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe ; De Geest, Gerrit</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c394t-88ee687ef611af9d7d3c0912e9a8d300d2fe3b4266f4b7f3190de5a430120e033</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2005</creationdate><topic>Accidents</topic><topic>Comparative negligence</topic><topic>Contract breaches</topic><topic>Contracts</topic><topic>Cost allocation</topic><topic>Cost efficiency</topic><topic>Law enforcement</topic><topic>Liability</topic><topic>Sharing</topic><topic>Social costs</topic><topic>Social welfare</topic><topic>Torts</topic><topic>Violations</topic><topic>Welfare</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>De Geest, Gerrit</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Military Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Criminal Justice Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Criminology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Criminal Justice (Alumni)</collection><collection>Criminal Justice Database</collection><collection>Military Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>The Journal of legal studies</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe</au><au>De Geest, Gerrit</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules</atitle><jtitle>The Journal of legal studies</jtitle><date>2005-01</date><risdate>2005</risdate><volume>34</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>207</spage><epage>237</epage><pages>207-237</pages><issn>0047-2530</issn><eissn>1537-5366</eissn><coden>JLGSAO</coden><abstract>Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show the conditions under which the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in general, preferred to rules that place the burden entirely on one party. Our analysis applies to loss sharing in tort liability, the allocation of police investigation efforts, contract remedies for nonverifiable breaches such as those that may occur in marriage and employment contracts, and the distribution of shares in partnerships.</abstract><cop>Chicago</cop><pub>The University of Chicago Press</pub><doi>10.1086/426853</doi><tpages>31</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0047-2530 |
| ispartof | The Journal of legal studies, 2005-01, Vol.34 (1), p.207-237 |
| issn | 0047-2530 1537-5366 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_crossref_primary_10_1086_426853 |
| source | HeinOnline Law Journal Library; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; University of Chicago Press Journals (Full run) |
| subjects | Accidents Comparative negligence Contract breaches Contracts Cost allocation Cost efficiency Law enforcement Liability Sharing Social costs Social welfare Torts Violations Welfare |
| title | The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-28T17%3A58%3A44IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20Filtering%20Effect%20of%20Sharing%20Rules&rft.jtitle=The%20Journal%20of%20legal%20studies&rft.au=Dari%E2%80%90Mattiacci,%20Giuseppe&rft.date=2005-01&rft.volume=34&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=207&rft.epage=237&rft.pages=207-237&rft.issn=0047-2530&rft.eissn=1537-5366&rft.coden=JLGSAO&rft_id=info:doi/10.1086/426853&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_cross%3E10.1086/426853%3C/jstor_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=235904365&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=10.1086/426853&rfr_iscdi=true |