Bargaining and Information: An Empirical Analysis of a Multistage Arbitration Game
We conduct an experimental analysis of final offer arbitration (FOA) with differentially informed players. Under FOA, the arbitrator must choose one of the two submitted offers. In our control, the uninformed player makes an offer to the informed player prior to the submission of offers to the arbit...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of labor economics 2001-10, Vol.19 (4), p.922-948 |
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| container_end_page | 948 |
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| container_title | Journal of labor economics |
| container_volume | 19 |
| creator | Pecorino, Paul Van Boening, Mark |
| description | We conduct an experimental analysis of final offer arbitration (FOA) with differentially informed players. Under FOA, the arbitrator must choose one of the two submitted offers. In our control, the uninformed player makes an offer to the informed player prior to the submission of offers to the arbitrator. The treatment allows negotiation after offers are submitted to the arbitrator. Because these offers are potentially binding, they may transmit privately held information and, thereby, lower the dispute rate. We find that allowing negotiation in the face of potentially binding offers lowers the dispute rate by 27 percentage points. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/322825 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of labor economics, 2001-10, Vol.19 (4), p.922-948 |
| issn | 0734-306X 1537-5307 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Alternative dispute resolution Arbitration Asymmetry Bargaining Conflict resolution Cost control Disputes Experiment design Experiments Fairness Fees Game theory Industrial relations Information Mixed strategy Modeling Negotiations Probabilities Professional baseball Securities industry Sports arbitration Statistical analysis Studies Wall Street |
| title | Bargaining and Information: An Empirical Analysis of a Multistage Arbitration Game |
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