Encyclopaedia, genealogy and tradition in pursuit of pluralist jurisprudence

This article explores the different avenues for pursuing pluralist jurisprudence. Using the critique of Neil MacCormick's 'institutional' pluralism (i.e. that it lapses into methodological monism) as a departure point, I explore the pre-suppositions and pre-commitments of genealogical and empirico-positivist approaches to legal studies. By reference to Alasdair MacIntyre's Gifford Lectures on encyclopaedia, genealogy, and tradition, I defend an empirico-positivist view of law and legal order, in which legal systems and their constituent entities exist as 'institutional facts'. Following MacIntyre, genealogy is ultimately unable to subject itself to its own methods and must devolve into a post-truth contest for power. However, a genealogical approach can enrich scholarship, revealing the inherent limits of theory and tempering the excesses of encyclopedic canonism. I suggest MacIntyre's preferred approach, tradition in the sense of a craft guild, as a third way worthy of consideration.