Primacy of functional knowledge in semantic representations: The case of living and nonliving things

In 3 experiments, participants decided whether sensory and functional features were true of living and nonliving concepts. In Experiments 1 and 2, concepts were presented twice: test phase followed study phase after either 3 min (Experiment 1) or 3 s (Experiment 2). At test, concepts were paired wit...

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Veröffentlicht in:Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006) 2006-11, Vol.59 (11), p.1984-2009
Hauptverfasser: Phelps, Fiona G., Macken, William J., Barry, Chris, Miles, Chris
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container_end_page 2009
container_issue 11
container_start_page 1984
container_title Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006)
container_volume 59
creator Phelps, Fiona G.
Macken, William J.
Barry, Chris
Miles, Chris
description In 3 experiments, participants decided whether sensory and functional features were true of living and nonliving concepts. In Experiments 1 and 2, concepts were presented twice: test phase followed study phase after either 3 min (Experiment 1) or 3 s (Experiment 2). At test, concepts were paired with the same feature as that at study, or a different feature from either the same modality (within-modality priming) or another modality (cross-modality priming). In both experiments functional decisions were faster than sensory decisions for living and nonliving concepts. Whilst no semantic priming occurred between study and test in Experiment 1, the shorter study-test interval of Experiment 2 did lead to test phase semantic priming. Here there was greater within- than cross-modality priming for sensory decisions, but equivalent within- and cross-modality priming for functional decisions owing to significantly greater facilitation of functional decisions from prior sensory decisions than vice versa. Experiment 3 involved a single verification phase: For half the participants the feature name preceded the concept name, and for half the concept name preceded the feature name. The functional processing advantage persisted irrespective of presentation order. Results suggest that functional information is central to the representation of all concepts: Function is processed faster than sensory information and is activated obligatorily.
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subjects Adolescent
Adult
Analysis of Variance
Biological and medical sciences
Concept Formation - physiology
Cues
Decision Making - physiology
Female
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Human
Humans
Knowledge
Learning. Memory
Life
Male
Memory
Memory, Short-Term - physiology
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Semantics
Students - psychology
Time Factors
title Primacy of functional knowledge in semantic representations: The case of living and nonliving things
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