Informal accountability. Street-level bureaucrats' tactics to defy bad reputation in agencies of the Argentinian justice system
This article illustrates how employees of the Argentinian Territorial Agency for Access to Justice fear being perceived as lazy bureaucrats involved in clientelist networks. In order to improve their image, they fulfil requirements for formal accountability, but use additional, informal modes of acc...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Oxford development studies 2020-07, Vol.48 (3), p.209-221 |
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description | This article illustrates how employees of the Argentinian Territorial Agency for Access to Justice fear being perceived as lazy bureaucrats involved in clientelist networks. In order to improve their image, they fulfil requirements for formal accountability, but use additional, informal modes of accountability to underline the agency's performance, impact and relevance. I illustrate that employees identify with the agency they are working for and are inspired in their accountability by methods that have proven to be effective in human rights movements and NGOs. Thus, my ethnographic example invites discussions in the overlapping fields of accountability and political activism. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1080/13600818.2020.1787368 |
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Street-level bureaucrats' tactics to defy bad reputation in agencies of the Argentinian justice system</title><author>Rohrer, Ingo</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c376t-87b0e6f168eed6c59b0cf7439f5af900aa7a4fed8a01ac4ca6d23c561a536923</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Accountability</topic><topic>Activism</topic><topic>Argentina</topic><topic>Bureaucrats</topic><topic>Clientelism</topic><topic>Ethnography</topic><topic>Human rights</topic><topic>Human rights movements</topic><topic>human Rights Organizations</topic><topic>informal accountability</topic><topic>Justice</topic><topic>justice system</topic><topic>NGOs</topic><topic>Nongovernmental organizations</topic><topic>political activism</topic><topic>Political participation</topic><topic>street-level bureaucrats</topic><topic>Tactics</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Rohrer, Ingo</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Oxford development studies</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Rohrer, Ingo</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Informal accountability. Street-level bureaucrats' tactics to defy bad reputation in agencies of the Argentinian justice system</atitle><jtitle>Oxford development studies</jtitle><date>2020-07-02</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>48</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>209</spage><epage>221</epage><pages>209-221</pages><issn>1360-0818</issn><eissn>1469-9966</eissn><abstract>This article illustrates how employees of the Argentinian Territorial Agency for Access to Justice fear being perceived as lazy bureaucrats involved in clientelist networks. In order to improve their image, they fulfil requirements for formal accountability, but use additional, informal modes of accountability to underline the agency's performance, impact and relevance. I illustrate that employees identify with the agency they are working for and are inspired in their accountability by methods that have proven to be effective in human rights movements and NGOs. 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subjects | Accountability Activism Argentina Bureaucrats Clientelism Ethnography Human rights Human rights movements human Rights Organizations informal accountability Justice justice system NGOs Nongovernmental organizations political activism Political participation street-level bureaucrats Tactics |
title | Informal accountability. Street-level bureaucrats' tactics to defy bad reputation in agencies of the Argentinian justice system |
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