A study of Spanish firms' security issue decision under asymmetric information and agency costs
The ability of asymmetric informational models and agency models is analysed to explain the firm's security issue choice and the market reaction to equity and bond issues. The results support mainly agency models as an explanation for the firm's decisions to issue debt or equity, while the...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Applied financial economics 2003-10, Vol.13 (10), p.771-782 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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