The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats

In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We desig...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of experimental political science 2024-03, Vol.11 (1), p.64-77
Hauptverfasser:	Smetana, Michal, Vranka, Marek, Rosendorf, Ondrej
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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