Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of China’s Industrial Giants
Recent scholarship suggests that authoritarian leaders may use seemingly democratic institutions to strengthen their own rule. In this vein, China’s leaders attempted to rein in local governments by introducing new transparency regulations, with environmental transparency a key focus. However, imple...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of politics 2014-01, Vol.76 (1), p.182-194 |
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creator | Lorentzen, Peter Landry, Pierre Yasuda, John |
description | Recent scholarship suggests that authoritarian leaders may use seemingly democratic institutions to strengthen their own rule. In this vein, China’s leaders attempted to rein in local governments by introducing new transparency regulations, with environmental transparency a key focus. However, implementing these requirements necessitates cooperation from the very actors who may be weakened by them. Surprisingly, more industrial or more polluted cities were no slower in implementing environmental transparency than cleaner ones, with pollution measured using satellite data in order to avoid relying on questionable official sources. However, cities dominated by large industrial firms lagged in implementing environmental transparency, and this effect appears strongest when a city’s largest firm is in a highly polluting industry. Our findings demonstrate that even institutional innovations designed to preserve authoritarian rule can face significant challenges of implementation. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S0022381613001114 |
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In this vein, China’s leaders attempted to rein in local governments by introducing new transparency regulations, with environmental transparency a key focus. However, implementing these requirements necessitates cooperation from the very actors who may be weakened by them. Surprisingly, more industrial or more polluted cities were no slower in implementing environmental transparency than cleaner ones, with pollution measured using satellite data in order to avoid relying on questionable official sources. However, cities dominated by large industrial firms lagged in implementing environmental transparency, and this effect appears strongest when a city’s largest firm is in a highly polluting industry. Our findings demonstrate that even institutional innovations designed to preserve authoritarian rule can face significant challenges of implementation.</description><subject>Accountability</subject><subject>Air pollutants</subject><subject>Authoritarianism</subject><subject>Authoritarianism (Political Ideology)</subject><subject>China</subject><subject>China (People's Republic)</subject><subject>Cities</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Decision-making</subject><subject>Democracy</subject><subject>Economic regulation</subject><subject>Environment</subject><subject>Environment and politics</subject><subject>Environmental pollution</subject><subject>Environmental regulation</subject><subject>Environmental regulations</subject><subject>Green economics</subject><subject>Implementation</subject><subject>Industrial policy</subject><subject>Industrial pollution</subject><subject>Industry</subject><subject>Innovations</subject><subject>Local government</subject><subject>Peoples Republic of China</subject><subject>Pollution</subject><subject>Pollution monitoring</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Satellites</subject><subject>Scholarship</subject><subject>Water pollution</subject><issn>0022-3816</issn><issn>1468-2508</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkc1qGzEQgEVpoK6TB-htoZde1p5Z_azUWzCNYwhJIc55kXe1towtOdJuQm59jb5eniQyDqS0DYkuEsz3jeaHkC8IIwQsx9cARUElCqQAiMg-kAEyIfOCg_xIBvtwvo9_Ip9jXEM6QrEBubxxjQlb66xbZqd9t_LBdjpY7bKZc_5Od9a779l8ZbKf_t6EzLfZZGWdfvz1Oyak6WOX6E02TUoXj8lRqzfRnDzfQzI_-zGfnOcXV9PZ5PQirzmjXa64wrJhVOkWmoZzaGmBhioGutHpqWldcCYZLKiAUmBbLoSiaKQEJRtJh-TbIe0u-NvexK7a2libzUY74_tYYZnaE6IA8TYqVFFIlsb2NsoBuWS8VAn9-he69n1wqeUKWepNlWnUicIDVQcfYzBttQt2q8NDhVDt11b9s7bkjA9OX69srZd-F0yML-n_Z4wOxjp2PrzrC_pclt4ugm2W5o_qX7WeAMp-syE</recordid><startdate>20140101</startdate><enddate>20140101</enddate><creator>Lorentzen, Peter</creator><creator>Landry, Pierre</creator><creator>Yasuda, John</creator><general>Cambridge University Press</general><general>University of Chicago Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20140101</creationdate><title>Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of China’s Industrial Giants</title><author>Lorentzen, Peter ; Landry, Pierre ; Yasuda, John</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c543t-95917d439af0dd550f321e3940ada321a3c254840b360761f7b6931e88098d83</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2014</creationdate><topic>Accountability</topic><topic>Air pollutants</topic><topic>Authoritarianism</topic><topic>Authoritarianism (Political Ideology)</topic><topic>China</topic><topic>China (People's Republic)</topic><topic>Cities</topic><topic>Cooperation</topic><topic>Decision-making</topic><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Economic regulation</topic><topic>Environment</topic><topic>Environment and politics</topic><topic>Environmental pollution</topic><topic>Environmental regulation</topic><topic>Environmental regulations</topic><topic>Green economics</topic><topic>Implementation</topic><topic>Industrial policy</topic><topic>Industrial pollution</topic><topic>Industry</topic><topic>Innovations</topic><topic>Local government</topic><topic>Peoples Republic of China</topic><topic>Pollution</topic><topic>Pollution monitoring</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>Satellites</topic><topic>Scholarship</topic><topic>Water pollution</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Lorentzen, Peter</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Landry, Pierre</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yasuda, John</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><jtitle>The Journal of politics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Lorentzen, Peter</au><au>Landry, Pierre</au><au>Yasuda, John</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of China’s Industrial Giants</atitle><jtitle>The Journal of politics</jtitle><addtitle>J of Pol</addtitle><date>2014-01-01</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>76</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>182</spage><epage>194</epage><pages>182-194</pages><issn>0022-3816</issn><eissn>1468-2508</eissn><coden>JPOLA3</coden><abstract>Recent scholarship suggests that authoritarian leaders may use seemingly democratic institutions to strengthen their own rule. In this vein, China’s leaders attempted to rein in local governments by introducing new transparency regulations, with environmental transparency a key focus. However, implementing these requirements necessitates cooperation from the very actors who may be weakened by them. Surprisingly, more industrial or more polluted cities were no slower in implementing environmental transparency than cleaner ones, with pollution measured using satellite data in order to avoid relying on questionable official sources. However, cities dominated by large industrial firms lagged in implementing environmental transparency, and this effect appears strongest when a city’s largest firm is in a highly polluting industry. 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source | PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; Political Science Complete |
subjects | Accountability Air pollutants Authoritarianism Authoritarianism (Political Ideology) China China (People's Republic) Cities Cooperation Decision-making Democracy Economic regulation Environment Environment and politics Environmental pollution Environmental regulation Environmental regulations Green economics Implementation Industrial policy Industrial pollution Industry Innovations Local government Peoples Republic of China Pollution Pollution monitoring Regulation Satellites Scholarship Water pollution |
title | Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of China’s Industrial Giants |
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