Choosing Investment Managers
Investment managers connected to plans sponsors are more likely to be hired than not-connected managers. The magnitude of the selection effect is comparable to that of prior performance. Ex post, connections do not result in higher post-hiring returns. Relationships are thus conducive to asset gathe...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 2023-09, p.1-33 |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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| Zusammenfassung: | Investment managers connected to plans sponsors are more likely to be hired than not-connected managers. The magnitude of the selection effect is comparable to that of prior performance. Ex post, connections do not result in higher post-hiring returns. Relationships are thus conducive to asset gathering by investment managers but do not generate commensurate pecuniary benefits for plan sponsors. |
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| ISSN: | 0022-1090 1756-6916 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/S0022109023001072 |