Green technology investment selection with carbon price and competition: One-to-many matching structure

With the deterioration of natural resources and the aggravation of environmental pollution, there is a growing imperative to implement industrial green reform through green technology investment (GTI). This paper constructs a nonlinear dual-objective function by drawing on the theory of two-sided matching under the carbon trading regulation, aiming to examine GTI selection decisions made by two oligarchic manufacturers (i.e., oligarchs) and a monopoly supplier (i.e., supplier). The supplier offers multiple green technologies, while oligarchs rack their brains to buy green technologies in an attempt to exploit their social, economic and environmental potentials. Available technologies vary in terms of their environmental efficiency and cost. Then, a two-sided matching mechanism is constructed to explore the availability of stable matchings and examine the impacts of the carbon price and green improvement coefficient on GTI, product pricing decisions and profits within a competitive environment. Finally, a Monte-Carlo experiment is designed to analyze the impact of uncertain market risks on supplier's decisions. The results show that there is a two-sided matching mechanism that enables oligarchs and suppliers to obtain stable matching solution sets. Higher carbon prices lead to higher product prices, lower market demand, and improved environmental performance. Product price and market demand are positively correlated with investment volumes of oligarchs themselves and negatively correlated with those of their competitors. Investment risk has a certain negative impact on suppliers' profitability.