Government regulation, horizontal coopetition, and low-carbon technology innovation: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of government and homogeneous energy enterprises

Low-carbon technology innovation (LCTI) is key to achieving energy conservation and emission reduction. As the main body of carbon emissions, accelerating the promotion of energy enterprises' LCTI is urgently needed. Based on the importance of horizontal coopetition and government regulation for enterprises' LCTI, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government and two homogeneous energy enterprises to clarify their dynamic behavior strategies. Furthermore, through numerical simulation, a sensitivity analysis of the effect of the main parameter changes on all parties' evolution is carried out. Moreover, we obtained the accurate optimal value of S&P (subsidies and penalties) by using a combination of random jumping and L-BFGS-B method. The findings indicate that (i) increasing the initial willingness of government and enterprises can facilitate faster system evolution towards optimal state. Early governmental intervention can be beneficial in preventing negative behavior of enterprises. (ii) There exists optimal range, and even optimal level, for government S&P, with penalties being more effective than subsidies in promoting LCTI. (iii)Low coopetition is ineffective while the intensity of coopetitive relationship is positively correlated with its’ effect. (iiii) Small-scale enterprises are more sensitive to changes in S&P measures and coopetition relationships. •Horizontal coopetition and government regulation's effect on LCTI are considered.•We provide a novel approach to obtain high-precision optimal subsidy intensity.•Early government intervention is beneficial in deterring firms' negative behavior.•Penalties are more effective than subsidies in promoting LCTI.•Weak coopetition is insufficient to motivate energy firms to implement LCTI.