Meaning, Expression, and Evidence
Grice’s (1957) analysis of non-natural meaning generated a huge industry, where new analyses were put forward to respond to successively more complex counterexamples. Davis (2003) offers a novel and refreshingly simple analysis of meaning in terms of the expression of belief, where (roughly) an agen...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Thought (Hoboken, N.J.) N.J.), 2012, Vol.1 (2), p.152-157 |
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| container_title | Thought (Hoboken, N.J.) |
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| creator | Buchanan, Ray |
| description | Grice’s (1957) analysis of non-natural meaning generated a huge industry, where new analyses were put forward to respond to successively more complex counterexamples. Davis (2003) offers a novel and refreshingly simple analysis of meaning in terms of the expression of belief, where (roughly) an agent expresses the belief that p just in case she performs a publicly observable action with the intention that it be an indication that she occurrently believes that p. I argue that Davis’s analysis fails to capture the essentially overt nature of our meaning-intentions, and with it, a plausible sufficient condition for meaning. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1002/tht.20 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| title | Meaning, Expression, and Evidence |
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