Group lending with endogenous group size

Group lending with endogenous group size

This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties in a community enhance borrowers incentives to exert e¤ort, a pro t-maximizing nancier chooses a group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient socia...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Bourjade, Sylvain, Schindele, Ibolya
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Group lending
Moral Hazard
Social capital
Online-Zugang:Volltext bestellen
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page
container_issue
container_start_page
container_title
container_volume
creator Bourjade, Sylvain
Schindele, Ibolya
description This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties in a community enhance borrowers incentives to exert e¤ort, a pro t-maximizing nancier chooses a group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient social ties do not receive funding. The result arises because there is a trade-o¤ between raising pro ts through increased group size and providing incentives for borrowers with less social ties. The result may explain why many micro-lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of small size
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>cristin_3HK</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_cristin_nora_11250_93766</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>11250_93766</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-cristin_nora_11250_937663</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNrjZNBwL8ovLVDISc1LycxLVyjPLMlQALLz01Pz8kuLFdLBssWZVak8DKxpiTnFqbxQmptB3s01xNlDN7kos7gkMy8-L78oMd7Q0MjUIN7S2NzMzJiwCgA_eyde</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>Group lending with endogenous group size</title><source>NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives</source><creator>Bourjade, Sylvain ; Schindele, Ibolya</creator><creatorcontrib>Bourjade, Sylvain ; Schindele, Ibolya</creatorcontrib><description>This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties in a community enhance borrowers incentives to exert e¤ort, a pro t-maximizing nancier chooses a group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient social ties do not receive funding. The result arises because there is a trade-o¤ between raising pro ts through increased group size and providing incentives for borrowers with less social ties. The result may explain why many micro-lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of small size</description><language>eng</language><publisher>Elsevier</publisher><subject>Group lending ; Moral Hazard ; Social capital</subject><creationdate>2012</creationdate><rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>230,780,885,26567</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93766$$EView_record_in_NORA$$FView_record_in_$$GNORA$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Bourjade, Sylvain</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schindele, Ibolya</creatorcontrib><title>Group lending with endogenous group size</title><description>This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties in a community enhance borrowers incentives to exert e¤ort, a pro t-maximizing nancier chooses a group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient social ties do not receive funding. The result arises because there is a trade-o¤ between raising pro ts through increased group size and providing incentives for borrowers with less social ties. The result may explain why many micro-lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of small size</description><subject>Group lending</subject><subject>Moral Hazard</subject><subject>Social capital</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>3HK</sourceid><recordid>eNrjZNBwL8ovLVDISc1LycxLVyjPLMlQALLz01Pz8kuLFdLBssWZVak8DKxpiTnFqbxQmptB3s01xNlDN7kos7gkMy8-L78oMd7Q0MjUIN7S2NzMzJiwCgA_eyde</recordid><startdate>2012</startdate><enddate>2012</enddate><creator>Bourjade, Sylvain</creator><creator>Schindele, Ibolya</creator><general>Elsevier</general><scope>3HK</scope></search><sort><creationdate>2012</creationdate><title>Group lending with endogenous group size</title><author>Bourjade, Sylvain ; Schindele, Ibolya</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-cristin_nora_11250_937663</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Group lending</topic><topic>Moral Hazard</topic><topic>Social capital</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Bourjade, Sylvain</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schindele, Ibolya</creatorcontrib><collection>NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Bourjade, Sylvain</au><au>Schindele, Ibolya</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Group lending with endogenous group size</atitle><date>2012</date><risdate>2012</risdate><abstract>This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties in a community enhance borrowers incentives to exert e¤ort, a pro t-maximizing nancier chooses a group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient social ties do not receive funding. The result arises because there is a trade-o¤ between raising pro ts through increased group size and providing incentives for borrowers with less social ties. The result may explain why many micro-lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of small size</abstract><pub>Elsevier</pub><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext_linktorsrc
identifier
ispartof
issn
language eng
recordid cdi_cristin_nora_11250_93766
source NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives
subjects Group lending
Moral Hazard
Social capital
title Group lending with endogenous group size
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-27T08%3A29%3A59IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-cristin_3HK&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Group%20lending%20with%20endogenous%20group%20size&rft.au=Bourjade,%20Sylvain&rft.date=2012&rft_id=info:doi/&rft_dat=%3Ccristin_3HK%3E11250_93766%3C/cristin_3HK%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true