Positioning and negotiations: The case of pharmaceutical pricing

We study a positioning game prior to negotiations where each party invests into influential activities in order to raise voter support for their preferred bargaining outcome. The case chosen for our analysis is a bilateral monopoly where a purchaser meets a pharmaceutical firm and where the two nego...

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Veröffentlicht in:	European Journal of Political Economy 2020-03, Vol.62, p.1-13, Article 101853
Hauptverfasser:	Grepperud, Sverre, Pedersen, Pål Andreas
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bargaining Campaigning Costs Games Group size Lobbying Medicine Monopolies Negotiation Pharmaceutical pricing Political economy Political parties Positioning Prices Production costs
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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