How Government Agencies React to Termination Threats

How Government Agencies React to Termination Threats

Abstract Much research following Kaufman’s classic study Are Government Organizations Immortal? has investigated the claim that government agencies enjoy great security and long life. Less attention has been paid to Kaufman’s thesis that government agencies facing a termination threat have strong in...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of public administration research and theory 2020-04, Vol.30 (2), p.324-338
Hauptverfasser: Askim, Jostein, Blom-Hansen, Jens, Houlberg, Kurt, Serritzlew, Søren
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container_issue 2
container_start_page 324
container_title Journal of public administration research and theory
container_volume 30
creator Askim, Jostein
Blom-Hansen, Jens
Houlberg, Kurt
Serritzlew, Søren
description Abstract Much research following Kaufman’s classic study Are Government Organizations Immortal? has investigated the claim that government agencies enjoy great security and long life. Less attention has been paid to Kaufman’s thesis that government agencies facing a termination threat have strong incentives to react. In a study of the on-going Norwegian local government amalgamation reform, we demonstrate that this type of government agency reacts by hoarding (i.e., a last-minute flurry of spending) when faced with a termination threat. This finding shows that agencies facing termination threats are active players in the termination game. We discuss implications for research on agency termination and design implications for reformers of the public sector.
doi_str_mv 10.1093/jopart/muz022
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1477-9803
language eng
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source EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives; Oxford Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete
title How Government Agencies React to Termination Threats
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