Mining and Local Corruption in Africa
We investigate whether mining affects local corruption in Africa. Several cross-country analyses report that natural resources have adverse effects on political institutions by increasing corruption, whereas other country-level studies show no evidence of such "political resource curses. "...
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Veröffentlicht in: | American journal of political science 2017-04, Vol.61 (2), p.320-334 |
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creator | Knutsen, Carl Henrik Kotsadam, Andreas Olsen, Eivind Hammersmark Wig, Tore |
description | We investigate whether mining affects local corruption in Africa. Several cross-country analyses report that natural resources have adverse effects on political institutions by increasing corruption, whereas other country-level studies show no evidence of such "political resource curses. " These studies face well-known endogeneity and other methodological issues, and employing micro-level data would allow for drawing stronger inferences. Hence, we connect 92,762 Afrobarometer survey respondents to spatial data on 496 industrial mines. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that mining increases bribe payments, and this result is robust to using alternative models. Mines are initially located in less corrupt areas, but mining areas turn more corrupt after mines open. When exploring mechanisms, we find that local economic activity relates differently to corruption in mining and non-mining areas, suggesting that mining income incentivizes and enables local officials already present to require more bribes. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/ajps.12268 |
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Several cross-country analyses report that natural resources have adverse effects on political institutions by increasing corruption, whereas other country-level studies show no evidence of such "political resource curses. " These studies face well-known endogeneity and other methodological issues, and employing micro-level data would allow for drawing stronger inferences. Hence, we connect 92,762 Afrobarometer survey respondents to spatial data on 496 industrial mines. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that mining increases bribe payments, and this result is robust to using alternative models. Mines are initially located in less corrupt areas, but mining areas turn more corrupt after mines open. When exploring mechanisms, we find that local economic activity relates differently to corruption in mining and non-mining areas, suggesting that mining income incentivizes and enables local officials already present to require more bribes.</description><subject>Africa</subject><subject>Bribery</subject><subject>Coal industry</subject><subject>Corruption</subject><subject>Corruption in government</subject><subject>Data analysis</subject><subject>Economic activity</subject><subject>Methodological problems</subject><subject>Mines</subject><subject>Mining</subject><subject>Mining industry</subject><subject>Natural resources</subject><subject>Offenses</subject><subject>Payments</subject><subject>Political institutions</subject><subject>Political science</subject><subject>Respondents</subject><subject>Side effects</subject><issn>0092-5853</issn><issn>1540-5907</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2017</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>3HK</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kEtLAzEURoMoWKsb9-KACCJMzXsyy1J8UlFQ1yGTZiTDmNRkBum_N3WsCxe9m8uF810OHwDHCE5QmivVLOMEYczFDhghRmHOSljsghGEJc6ZYGQfHMTYwHTTkozA-aN11r1nyi2yudeqzWY-hH7ZWe8y67JpHaxWh2CvVm00R797DN5url9nd_n86fZ-Np3nmgkocoQpZkSoAvIFFRVTQpcVM6gmFSem1IIUlNeUEK0ZpIiXVa1FVSmdXCqIFmQMToe_OtjYWSedD0oiKBiWrOSYJuJiIJbBf_YmdvLDRm3aVjnj-yiRKBFNr_kaPfuHNr4PLvlLTDkvWAELvI1CQhAMIUY8UZcbMR9jMLVcBvuhwirJyXXzct28_Gk-wWiAv2xrVltIOX14ftlkToZMEzsf_jKYE0ELQsk3NWCJ0w</recordid><startdate>201704</startdate><enddate>201704</enddate><creator>Knutsen, Carl Henrik</creator><creator>Kotsadam, Andreas</creator><creator>Olsen, Eivind Hammersmark</creator><creator>Wig, Tore</creator><general>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</general><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><general>University of Texas Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>3HK</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201704</creationdate><title>Mining and Local Corruption in Africa</title><author>Knutsen, Carl Henrik ; Kotsadam, Andreas ; Olsen, Eivind Hammersmark ; Wig, Tore</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5808-1242538a706d48b5a8c9b5e1f3b63e9c83746f433cc504169bfc8bbac949b01d3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2017</creationdate><topic>Africa</topic><topic>Bribery</topic><topic>Coal industry</topic><topic>Corruption</topic><topic>Corruption in government</topic><topic>Data analysis</topic><topic>Economic activity</topic><topic>Methodological problems</topic><topic>Mines</topic><topic>Mining</topic><topic>Mining industry</topic><topic>Natural resources</topic><topic>Offenses</topic><topic>Payments</topic><topic>Political institutions</topic><topic>Political science</topic><topic>Respondents</topic><topic>Side effects</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Knutsen, Carl Henrik</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kotsadam, Andreas</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Olsen, Eivind Hammersmark</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wig, Tore</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives</collection><jtitle>American journal of political science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Knutsen, Carl Henrik</au><au>Kotsadam, Andreas</au><au>Olsen, Eivind Hammersmark</au><au>Wig, Tore</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Mining and Local Corruption in Africa</atitle><jtitle>American journal of political science</jtitle><date>2017-04</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>61</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>320</spage><epage>334</epage><pages>320-334</pages><issn>0092-5853</issn><eissn>1540-5907</eissn><coden>AJPLB4</coden><abstract>We investigate whether mining affects local corruption in Africa. Several cross-country analyses report that natural resources have adverse effects on political institutions by increasing corruption, whereas other country-level studies show no evidence of such "political resource curses. " These studies face well-known endogeneity and other methodological issues, and employing micro-level data would allow for drawing stronger inferences. Hence, we connect 92,762 Afrobarometer survey respondents to spatial data on 496 industrial mines. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that mining increases bribe payments, and this result is robust to using alternative models. Mines are initially located in less corrupt areas, but mining areas turn more corrupt after mines open. When exploring mechanisms, we find that local economic activity relates differently to corruption in mining and non-mining areas, suggesting that mining income incentivizes and enables local officials already present to require more bribes.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</pub><doi>10.1111/ajps.12268</doi><tpages>15</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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source | Jstor Complete Legacy; NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts |
subjects | Africa Bribery Coal industry Corruption Corruption in government Data analysis Economic activity Methodological problems Mines Mining Mining industry Natural resources Offenses Payments Political institutions Political science Respondents Side effects |
title | Mining and Local Corruption in Africa |
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