Mining and Local Corruption in Africa

We investigate whether mining affects local corruption in Africa. Several cross-country analyses report that natural resources have adverse effects on political institutions by increasing corruption, whereas other country-level studies show no evidence of such "political resource curses. "...

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Veröffentlicht in:American journal of political science 2017-04, Vol.61 (2), p.320-334
Hauptverfasser: Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Kotsadam, Andreas, Olsen, Eivind Hammersmark, Wig, Tore
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container_issue 2
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container_title American journal of political science
container_volume 61
creator Knutsen, Carl Henrik
Kotsadam, Andreas
Olsen, Eivind Hammersmark
Wig, Tore
description We investigate whether mining affects local corruption in Africa. Several cross-country analyses report that natural resources have adverse effects on political institutions by increasing corruption, whereas other country-level studies show no evidence of such "political resource curses. " These studies face well-known endogeneity and other methodological issues, and employing micro-level data would allow for drawing stronger inferences. Hence, we connect 92,762 Afrobarometer survey respondents to spatial data on 496 industrial mines. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that mining increases bribe payments, and this result is robust to using alternative models. Mines are initially located in less corrupt areas, but mining areas turn more corrupt after mines open. When exploring mechanisms, we find that local economic activity relates differently to corruption in mining and non-mining areas, suggesting that mining income incentivizes and enables local officials already present to require more bribes.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/ajps.12268
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source Jstor Complete Legacy; NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects Africa
Bribery
Coal industry
Corruption
Corruption in government
Data analysis
Economic activity
Methodological problems
Mines
Mining
Mining industry
Natural resources
Offenses
Payments
Political institutions
Political science
Respondents
Side effects
title Mining and Local Corruption in Africa
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