In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism

In this paper, we defend the main claims of our earlier paper “Mental Fictionalism as an Undermotivated Theory” (in The Monist) from Gábor Bács’s criticism, which appeared in his “Mental fictionalism and epiphenomenal qualia” (in Dialectica). In our earlier paper, we tried to show that mental fictio...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Organon F 2020-05, Vol.27 (2), p.169-196
Hauptverfasser:	Márton, Miklós, Tőzsér, János
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	conceptual dependence Epistemology folk psychology mental antirealism mental fictionalism Philosophy of Mind verificationism
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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