INACZEJ POJĘTA ZASADA HAMULCÓW I RÓWNOWAGI. WOKÓŁ WARTOŚCI SZWAJCARSKIEGO KONSTYTUCJONALIZMU

This article aims to show that the Swiss institution of referendum rejecting a bill can be seen as a mechanism of checks and balances, involving not so much relations between particular authorities as between the authorities and the nation in general. Such an approach is especially possible thanks to the political thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, interpreted in a similar spirit by Mads Qvortrup. However, given the more fundamental significance of the idea of the direct rule of citizens developed by Rousseau, the institution of people's veto can have more fundamental political consequences for sovereign relations. By comparing these solutions with the political system of Switzerland, most widely analysed by Wolf Linder, the author demonstrates that the Swiss system offers the best combination of the preponderance of parliament with the ideals of direct democracy.