Dlaczego nieśmiertelność nie jest taka zła

Dlaczego nieśmiertelność nie jest taka zła

The author argues that immortality need not be as bad as Bernard Williams says it would be. He argues that if an immortal life were characterized by a sufficiently diverse package of experiences, appropriately distributed, there is no reason to think that one would become bored (just as there is no...

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Veröffentlicht in:Roczniki filozoficzne 2016, Vol.64 (1), p.153-170
1. Verfasser: Fischer, John Martin
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Sprache:pol
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Ethics / Practical Philosophy
TŁUMACZENIA
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creator Fischer, John Martin
description The author argues that immortality need not be as bad as Bernard Williams says it would be. He argues that if an immortal life were characterized by a sufficiently diverse package of experiences, appropriately distributed, there is no reason to think that one would become bored (just as there is no reason to think that one would become bored of such experiences in a finite life). He acknowledges that some pleasurable experiences would be “self-exhausting,” but he says that there are enough “repeatable pleasures” to avoid the tedium of which Bernard Williams speaks.
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TŁUMACZENIA
title Dlaczego nieśmiertelność nie jest taka zła
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