ARISTOTELES’TE PRATİK AKIL YÜRÜTME: LOGISMOS
Aristotle’s distinction between the theoretical and the practical sciences leads to two types of reasoning. While the subject of theoretical sciences is the immoveable entities, the subject of practical sciences is the contingent field of action. The primary motivation that drives people to action i...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Bingöl Üniversitesi sosyal bilimler enstitüsü dergisi 2023-10, Vol.13 (26), p.201-210 |
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description | Aristotle’s distinction between the theoretical and the practical sciences leads to two types of reasoning. While the subject of theoretical sciences is the immoveable entities, the subject of practical sciences is the contingent field of action. The primary motivation that drives people to action is a preference, and behind every preference, there is practical reasoning (logismos). The concept of logismos, which has a rich content of meaning and derives from the concept of ‘logos’, which can be accepted as the reason for this richness, is one of the concepts that determine the choice of action. According to Aristotle, reason in the practical field operates differently from the classical theoretical syllogism, which aims to reach the truth and is the essential tool of theoretical reasoning. Because the practical field is where probability prevails, as stated. Therefore, the first thing to do to clarify the meaning of logismos is to identify its difference from the theoretical syllogism. How does the agent reason while an action occurs, and how does this reasoning relate to the theoretical syllogism, which is the classical Aristotelian reasoning? First of all, practical reasoning has at least two premises, one of which expresses something desired, and the other states a perceptual judgment, a state of affairs. However, the conclusion derived from these premises is not a proposition, contrary to the theoretical syllogism, but an action. Practical reasoning differs formally from theoretical syllogism and does not have the precision that theoretical syllogism has. |
doi_str_mv | 10.29029/busbed.1296500 |
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How does the agent reason while an action occurs, and how does this reasoning relate to the theoretical syllogism, which is the classical Aristotelian reasoning? First of all, practical reasoning has at least two premises, one of which expresses something desired, and the other states a perceptual judgment, a state of affairs. However, the conclusion derived from these premises is not a proposition, contrary to the theoretical syllogism, but an action. 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language | eng ; tur |
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source | Central and Eastern European Online Library; EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals |
subjects | Ancient Philosphy Ethics / Practical Philosophy |
title | ARISTOTELES’TE PRATİK AKIL YÜRÜTME: LOGISMOS |
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