Peerage
Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective stren...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Episteme 2009-10, Vol.6 (3), p.313-323 |
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| container_title | Episteme |
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| creator | Conee, Earl |
| description | Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3366/E1742360009000732 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1742-3600 |
| ispartof | Episteme, 2009-10, Vol.6 (3), p.313-323 |
| issn | 1742-3600 1750-0117 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_cambridge_journals_10_3366_E1742360009000732 |
| source | Cambridge Journals Online |
| subjects | Philosophy and Religion |
| title | Peerage |
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