Malicious RIS Meets RSMA: Unveiling the Robustness of Rate Splitting to RIS-Induced Attacks
While the robustness of rate-splitting multiple access (RSMA) to imperfect channel state information (CSI) is well-documented, its susceptibility to attacks launched with malicious reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs) remains unexplored. This paper fills this gap by investigating three potenti...
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creator | de Sena, A. S Gomes, A Kibiłda, J Mahmood, N. H DaSilva, L. A Latva-aho, M |
description | While the robustness of rate-splitting multiple access (RSMA) to imperfect
channel state information (CSI) is well-documented, its susceptibility to
attacks launched with malicious reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs)
remains unexplored. This paper fills this gap by investigating three potential
RIS-induced attacks against RSMA in a multi-user multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) network: random interference, aligned interference, and mitigation
attack. The random interference attack employs random RIS coefficients to
disrupt RSMA. The other two attacks are triggered by optimizing the RIS through
weighted-sum strategies based on the projected gradient method. Simulation
results reveal significant degradation caused by all the attacks under perfect
CSI conditions. Remarkably, when imperfect CSI is considered, RSMA, owing to
its flexible power allocation strategy designed to counter CSI-related
interference, can be robust to the attacks even when the base station is blind
to them. It is also shown that RSMA can significantly outperform conventional
space-division multiple access (SDMA). |
doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.2408.13035 |
format | Article |
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channel state information (CSI) is well-documented, its susceptibility to
attacks launched with malicious reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs)
remains unexplored. This paper fills this gap by investigating three potential
RIS-induced attacks against RSMA in a multi-user multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) network: random interference, aligned interference, and mitigation
attack. The random interference attack employs random RIS coefficients to
disrupt RSMA. The other two attacks are triggered by optimizing the RIS through
weighted-sum strategies based on the projected gradient method. Simulation
results reveal significant degradation caused by all the attacks under perfect
CSI conditions. Remarkably, when imperfect CSI is considered, RSMA, owing to
its flexible power allocation strategy designed to counter CSI-related
interference, can be robust to the attacks even when the base station is blind
to them. It is also shown that RSMA can significantly outperform conventional
space-division multiple access (SDMA).</description><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2408.13035</identifier><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024-08</creationdate><rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,776,881</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2408.13035$$EView_record_in_Cornell_University$$FView_record_in_$$GCornell_University$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2408.13035$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>de Sena, A. S</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gomes, A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kibiłda, J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mahmood, N. H</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>DaSilva, L. A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Latva-aho, M</creatorcontrib><title>Malicious RIS Meets RSMA: Unveiling the Robustness of Rate Splitting to RIS-Induced Attacks</title><description>While the robustness of rate-splitting multiple access (RSMA) to imperfect
channel state information (CSI) is well-documented, its susceptibility to
attacks launched with malicious reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs)
remains unexplored. This paper fills this gap by investigating three potential
RIS-induced attacks against RSMA in a multi-user multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) network: random interference, aligned interference, and mitigation
attack. The random interference attack employs random RIS coefficients to
disrupt RSMA. The other two attacks are triggered by optimizing the RIS through
weighted-sum strategies based on the projected gradient method. Simulation
results reveal significant degradation caused by all the attacks under perfect
CSI conditions. Remarkably, when imperfect CSI is considered, RSMA, owing to
its flexible power allocation strategy designed to counter CSI-related
interference, can be robust to the attacks even when the base station is blind
to them. It is also shown that RSMA can significantly outperform conventional
space-division multiple access (SDMA).</description><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNpjYJA0NNAzsTA1NdBPLKrILNMzMjGw0DM0NjA25WSI9k3MyUzOzC8tVgjyDFbwTU0tAbKCfR2tFELzylIzczLz0hVKMlIVgvKTSotL8lKLixXy0xSCEktSFYILcjJLSsAK8kG6dT3zUkqTU1MUHEtKEpOzi3kYWNMSc4pTeaE0N4O8m2uIs4cu2BnxBUWZuYlFlfEg58SDnWNMWAUALnc_Kg</recordid><startdate>20240823</startdate><enddate>20240823</enddate><creator>de Sena, A. S</creator><creator>Gomes, A</creator><creator>Kibiłda, J</creator><creator>Mahmood, N. H</creator><creator>DaSilva, L. A</creator><creator>Latva-aho, M</creator><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20240823</creationdate><title>Malicious RIS Meets RSMA: Unveiling the Robustness of Rate Splitting to RIS-Induced Attacks</title><author>de Sena, A. S ; Gomes, A ; Kibiłda, J ; Mahmood, N. H ; DaSilva, L. A ; Latva-aho, M</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-arxiv_primary_2408_130353</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>de Sena, A. S</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gomes, A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kibiłda, J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mahmood, N. H</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>DaSilva, L. A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Latva-aho, M</creatorcontrib><collection>arXiv.org</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>de Sena, A. S</au><au>Gomes, A</au><au>Kibiłda, J</au><au>Mahmood, N. H</au><au>DaSilva, L. A</au><au>Latva-aho, M</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Malicious RIS Meets RSMA: Unveiling the Robustness of Rate Splitting to RIS-Induced Attacks</atitle><date>2024-08-23</date><risdate>2024</risdate><abstract>While the robustness of rate-splitting multiple access (RSMA) to imperfect
channel state information (CSI) is well-documented, its susceptibility to
attacks launched with malicious reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs)
remains unexplored. This paper fills this gap by investigating three potential
RIS-induced attacks against RSMA in a multi-user multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) network: random interference, aligned interference, and mitigation
attack. The random interference attack employs random RIS coefficients to
disrupt RSMA. The other two attacks are triggered by optimizing the RIS through
weighted-sum strategies based on the projected gradient method. Simulation
results reveal significant degradation caused by all the attacks under perfect
CSI conditions. Remarkably, when imperfect CSI is considered, RSMA, owing to
its flexible power allocation strategy designed to counter CSI-related
interference, can be robust to the attacks even when the base station is blind
to them. It is also shown that RSMA can significantly outperform conventional
space-division multiple access (SDMA).</abstract><doi>10.48550/arxiv.2408.13035</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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title | Malicious RIS Meets RSMA: Unveiling the Robustness of Rate Splitting to RIS-Induced Attacks |
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