Deep Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Combinatorial Auctions

Revenue-optimal auction design is a challenging problem with significant theoretical and practical implications. Sequential auction mechanisms, known for their simplicity and strong strategyproofness guarantees, are often limited by theoretical results that are largely existential, except for certai...

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Hauptverfasser:	Ravindranath, Sai Srivatsa, Feng, Zhe, Wang, Di, Zaheer, Manzil, Mehta, Aranyak, Parkes, David C
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Computer Science - Learning
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