Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based Mechanisms for all Approximation Guarantees

We consider truthful combinatorial auctions with items \(M = [m]\) for sale to \(n\) bidders, where each bidder \(i\) has a private monotone valuation \(v_i : 2^M \to R_+\). Among truthful mechanisms, maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanisms achieve the best-known approximation guarantees among all poly-co...

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Veröffentlicht in:	arXiv.org 2024-03
Hauptverfasser:	Qiu, Frederick V, Weinberg, S Matthew
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Approximation Bids Combinatorial analysis Communication Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Guarantees Lower bounds Mathematical analysis Representations
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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