All-pay Auction Based Profit Maximization in End-to-End Computation Offloading System
Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC) to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme based on the all-pay auction model in end-to-end collaboration environ...
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creator | Xue, Hai Xia, Yun Zhang, Di Wei, Honghua Xu, Xiaolong |
description | Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately
determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC)
to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme
based on the all-pay auction model in end-to-end collaboration environment,
wherein all EUs can acquire the service at a lower price than the own value of
the required resource. In addition, we propose a set allocation algorithm to
divide all the bidders into different sets according to the price, and the EUs
in each set get the service, which averts the case of getting no service due to
the low price. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed
scheme can effectively maximize the total profit of the edge offloading system,
and guarantee all EUs can access the service. |
doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.2403.09129 |
format | Article |
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determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC)
to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme
based on the all-pay auction model in end-to-end collaboration environment,
wherein all EUs can acquire the service at a lower price than the own value of
the required resource. In addition, we propose a set allocation algorithm to
divide all the bidders into different sets according to the price, and the EUs
in each set get the service, which averts the case of getting no service due to
the low price. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed
scheme can effectively maximize the total profit of the edge offloading system,
and guarantee all EUs can access the service.</description><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2403.09129</identifier><language>eng</language><subject>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</subject><creationdate>2024-03</creationdate><rights>http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,776,881</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2403.09129$$EView_record_in_Cornell_University$$FView_record_in_$$GCornell_University$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2403.09129$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Xue, Hai</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xia, Yun</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhang, Di</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wei, Honghua</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xu, Xiaolong</creatorcontrib><title>All-pay Auction Based Profit Maximization in End-to-End Computation Offloading System</title><description>Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately
determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC)
to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme
based on the all-pay auction model in end-to-end collaboration environment,
wherein all EUs can acquire the service at a lower price than the own value of
the required resource. In addition, we propose a set allocation algorithm to
divide all the bidders into different sets according to the price, and the EUs
in each set get the service, which averts the case of getting no service due to
the low price. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed
scheme can effectively maximize the total profit of the edge offloading system,
and guarantee all EUs can access the service.</description><subject>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNotj8lOwzAUAH3hgAofwAn_gIPzYsf2MURlkYqKRHuOXr1UlrIpSVHD1wNpT3MYaaQh5CHlidBS8icczvE7AcGzhJsUzC3ZF3XNepxpcbJT7Fr6jKN39HPoQpzoB55jE39wMbGl69axqWN_oGXX9KfpYrYh1B262B7p1zxOvrkjNwHr0d9fuSK7l_WufGOb7et7WWwY5sowrR14L8Fn3KYoQAVrFRjIMRcHLbXhYC13SuSHNIDTwnjhQSrlrcXMQrYij5fs8lX1Q2xwmKv_v2r5y34BnWVLCA</recordid><startdate>20240314</startdate><enddate>20240314</enddate><creator>Xue, Hai</creator><creator>Xia, Yun</creator><creator>Zhang, Di</creator><creator>Wei, Honghua</creator><creator>Xu, Xiaolong</creator><scope>AKY</scope><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20240314</creationdate><title>All-pay Auction Based Profit Maximization in End-to-End Computation Offloading System</title><author>Xue, Hai ; Xia, Yun ; Zhang, Di ; Wei, Honghua ; Xu, Xiaolong</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a679-88d2ee52e30c1a427fcc72926a64b858902cc0d746b1f2d849e4e2577ecca3c23</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Xue, Hai</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xia, Yun</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhang, Di</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wei, Honghua</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xu, Xiaolong</creatorcontrib><collection>arXiv Computer Science</collection><collection>arXiv.org</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Xue, Hai</au><au>Xia, Yun</au><au>Zhang, Di</au><au>Wei, Honghua</au><au>Xu, Xiaolong</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>All-pay Auction Based Profit Maximization in End-to-End Computation Offloading System</atitle><date>2024-03-14</date><risdate>2024</risdate><abstract>Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately
determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC)
to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme
based on the all-pay auction model in end-to-end collaboration environment,
wherein all EUs can acquire the service at a lower price than the own value of
the required resource. In addition, we propose a set allocation algorithm to
divide all the bidders into different sets according to the price, and the EUs
in each set get the service, which averts the case of getting no service due to
the low price. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed
scheme can effectively maximize the total profit of the edge offloading system,
and guarantee all EUs can access the service.</abstract><doi>10.48550/arxiv.2403.09129</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory |
title | All-pay Auction Based Profit Maximization in End-to-End Computation Offloading System |
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