All-pay Auction Based Profit Maximization in End-to-End Computation Offloading System

Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC) to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme based on the all-pay auction model in end-to-end collaboration environ...

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Hauptverfasser: Xue, Hai, Xia, Yun, Zhang, Di, Wei, Honghua, Xu, Xiaolong
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Xia, Yun
Zhang, Di
Wei, Honghua
Xu, Xiaolong
description Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC) to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme based on the all-pay auction model in end-to-end collaboration environment, wherein all EUs can acquire the service at a lower price than the own value of the required resource. In addition, we propose a set allocation algorithm to divide all the bidders into different sets according to the price, and the EUs in each set get the service, which averts the case of getting no service due to the low price. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can effectively maximize the total profit of the edge offloading system, and guarantee all EUs can access the service.
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title All-pay Auction Based Profit Maximization in End-to-End Computation Offloading System
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