Optimal Design of Climate Disclosure Policies: Transparency versus Externality
Does a more transparent climate disclosure policy induce lower emissions? This paper examines the welfare implications of transparency in climate disclosure regulation. Increased disclosure transparency could result in a larger equilibrium externality, but never leaves the firm worse off. Consequent...
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| creator | Li, Shangen |
| description | Does a more transparent climate disclosure policy induce lower emissions?
This paper examines the welfare implications of transparency in climate
disclosure regulation. Increased disclosure transparency could result in a
larger equilibrium externality, but never leaves the firm worse off.
Consequently, mandating full disclosure is no different from maximizing the
firm's private benefit while disregarding the ensuing externality. Transparency
beyond binary disclosure is necessary only when the firm holds private
information about its incentives for emission reduction. I provide conditions
under which focusing on threshold disclosure policies entails no loss of
generality. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.2402.11961 |
| format | Article |
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This paper examines the welfare implications of transparency in climate
disclosure regulation. Increased disclosure transparency could result in a
larger equilibrium externality, but never leaves the firm worse off.
Consequently, mandating full disclosure is no different from maximizing the
firm's private benefit while disregarding the ensuing externality. Transparency
beyond binary disclosure is necessary only when the firm holds private
information about its incentives for emission reduction. I provide conditions
under which focusing on threshold disclosure policies entails no loss of
generality.</description><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2402.11961</identifier><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024-02</creationdate><rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,777,882</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11961$$EView_record_in_Cornell_University$$FView_record_in_$$GCornell_University$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2402.11961$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Li, Shangen</creatorcontrib><title>Optimal Design of Climate Disclosure Policies: Transparency versus Externality</title><description>Does a more transparent climate disclosure policy induce lower emissions?
This paper examines the welfare implications of transparency in climate
disclosure regulation. Increased disclosure transparency could result in a
larger equilibrium externality, but never leaves the firm worse off.
Consequently, mandating full disclosure is no different from maximizing the
firm's private benefit while disregarding the ensuing externality. Transparency
beyond binary disclosure is necessary only when the firm holds private
information about its incentives for emission reduction. I provide conditions
under which focusing on threshold disclosure policies entails no loss of
generality.</description><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNotj8tOwzAURL1hgQofwAr_QEJu_IjLDqXlIVUti-yjWz-QJZNEdlo1f48pzGJGGmmu7iHkAaqSKyGqJ4wXfy5rXtUlwFrCLdkfptl_Y6Abm_zXQEdH25CL2dKNTzqM6RQt_RyD196mZ9pFHNKE0Q56oWcb0ynR7WW2ccDg5-WO3DgMyd7_54p0r9uufS92h7eP9mVXoGyg4AqOUjulgMGaCcFrjaa2DUOnjORaQtaRG8ENZKsN4wjoOGuUzVvOVuTx7-wVqJ9i_jgu_S9YfwVjP6jeSIs</recordid><startdate>20240219</startdate><enddate>20240219</enddate><creator>Li, Shangen</creator><scope>ADEOX</scope><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20240219</creationdate><title>Optimal Design of Climate Disclosure Policies: Transparency versus Externality</title><author>Li, Shangen</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a671-481b6cf88131935542cad2e73af8d64c61111b4d54d1d542d34a1af4378e48143</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Li, Shangen</creatorcontrib><collection>arXiv Economics</collection><collection>arXiv.org</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Li, Shangen</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Optimal Design of Climate Disclosure Policies: Transparency versus Externality</atitle><date>2024-02-19</date><risdate>2024</risdate><abstract>Does a more transparent climate disclosure policy induce lower emissions?
This paper examines the welfare implications of transparency in climate
disclosure regulation. Increased disclosure transparency could result in a
larger equilibrium externality, but never leaves the firm worse off.
Consequently, mandating full disclosure is no different from maximizing the
firm's private benefit while disregarding the ensuing externality. Transparency
beyond binary disclosure is necessary only when the firm holds private
information about its incentives for emission reduction. I provide conditions
under which focusing on threshold disclosure policies entails no loss of
generality.</abstract><doi>10.48550/arxiv.2402.11961</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| title | Optimal Design of Climate Disclosure Policies: Transparency versus Externality |
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