Coherent Distorted Beliefs

Many models of economics assume that individuals distort objective probabilities. We propose a simple consistency condition on distortion functions, which we term distortion coherence, that ensures that the function commutes with conditioning on an event. We show that distortion coherence restricts...

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Hauptverfasser: Chambers, Christopher P, Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, Raymond, Collin
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Raymond, Collin
description Many models of economics assume that individuals distort objective probabilities. We propose a simple consistency condition on distortion functions, which we term distortion coherence, that ensures that the function commutes with conditioning on an event. We show that distortion coherence restricts belief distortions to have a particular function form: power-weighted distortions, where distorted beliefs are proportional to the original beliefs raised to a power and weighted by a state-specific value. We generalize our findings to allow for distortions of the probabilities assigned to both states and signals, which nests the functional forms widely used in studying probabilistic biases (e.g., Grether, 1980 and Benjamin, 2019). We show how coherent distorted beliefs are tightly related to several extant models of motivated beliefs: they are the outcome of maximizing anticipated expected utility subject to a generalized Kullback-Liebler cost of distortion. Moreover, in the domain of lottery choice, we link coherent distortions to explanations of non-expected utility like the Allais paradox: individuals who maximize subjective expected utility maximizers conditional on coherent distorted beliefs are equivalent to the weighted utility maximizers studied by Chew [1983].
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