Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators
We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to calculate the security of the system in the mixed Nash equilibrium, as a...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext bestellen |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | |
|---|---|
| container_issue | |
| container_start_page | |
| container_title | |
| container_volume | |
| creator | Mamageishvili, Akaki Felten, Edward W |
| description | We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check
computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to
calculate the security of the system in the mixed Nash equilibrium, as a
function of the number of validators and their stake sizes. Our results provide
lower and upper bounds on the optimal number of validators. More concretely, a
minimal feasible number of validators minimizes the probability of failure. The
framework also allows to calculate optimum stake sizes, depending on the target
function. In the end, we discuss optimal design of rewards by the protocol for
validators. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.2308.02880 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>arxiv_GOX</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_arxiv_primary_2308_02880</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2308_02880</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-a670-e95d064f57de38c7dbc340d358231d2da0fad4953cad78169f52151aa21c4e113</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotzrsKwjAUgOEsDqI-gJPdnFpPbm06ingDQdDiWo45CRaqlVRF3168TP_28zE25JAoozVMMDyrRyIkmASEMdBl4_XFusuterhob0_u7NrINyHaNXV9v0YHrCvCWxPaPut4rFs3-LfHisW8mK3izXa5nk03MaYZxC7XBKnyOiMnjc3oaKUCktoIyUkQgkdSuZYWKTM8zb0WXHNEwa1ynMseG_22X2l5DdUZw6v8iMuvWL4BlhQ6ZQ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators</title><source>arXiv.org</source><creator>Mamageishvili, Akaki ; Felten, Edward W</creator><creatorcontrib>Mamageishvili, Akaki ; Felten, Edward W</creatorcontrib><description>We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check
computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to
calculate the security of the system in the mixed Nash equilibrium, as a
function of the number of validators and their stake sizes. Our results provide
lower and upper bounds on the optimal number of validators. More concretely, a
minimal feasible number of validators minimizes the probability of failure. The
framework also allows to calculate optimum stake sizes, depending on the target
function. In the end, we discuss optimal design of rewards by the protocol for
validators.</description><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2308.02880</identifier><language>eng</language><subject>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory ; Computer Science - Cryptography and Security</subject><creationdate>2023-08</creationdate><rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,780,885</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2308.02880$$EView_record_in_Cornell_University$$FView_record_in_$$GCornell_University$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2308.02880$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Mamageishvili, Akaki</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Felten, Edward W</creatorcontrib><title>Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators</title><description>We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check
computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to
calculate the security of the system in the mixed Nash equilibrium, as a
function of the number of validators and their stake sizes. Our results provide
lower and upper bounds on the optimal number of validators. More concretely, a
minimal feasible number of validators minimizes the probability of failure. The
framework also allows to calculate optimum stake sizes, depending on the target
function. In the end, we discuss optimal design of rewards by the protocol for
validators.</description><subject>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</subject><subject>Computer Science - Cryptography and Security</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2023</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNotzrsKwjAUgOEsDqI-gJPdnFpPbm06ingDQdDiWo45CRaqlVRF3168TP_28zE25JAoozVMMDyrRyIkmASEMdBl4_XFusuterhob0_u7NrINyHaNXV9v0YHrCvCWxPaPut4rFs3-LfHisW8mK3izXa5nk03MaYZxC7XBKnyOiMnjc3oaKUCktoIyUkQgkdSuZYWKTM8zb0WXHNEwa1ynMseG_22X2l5DdUZw6v8iMuvWL4BlhQ6ZQ</recordid><startdate>20230805</startdate><enddate>20230805</enddate><creator>Mamageishvili, Akaki</creator><creator>Felten, Edward W</creator><scope>AKY</scope><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20230805</creationdate><title>Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators</title><author>Mamageishvili, Akaki ; Felten, Edward W</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a670-e95d064f57de38c7dbc340d358231d2da0fad4953cad78169f52151aa21c4e113</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2023</creationdate><topic>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</topic><topic>Computer Science - Cryptography and Security</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Mamageishvili, Akaki</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Felten, Edward W</creatorcontrib><collection>arXiv Computer Science</collection><collection>arXiv.org</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Mamageishvili, Akaki</au><au>Felten, Edward W</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators</atitle><date>2023-08-05</date><risdate>2023</risdate><abstract>We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check
computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to
calculate the security of the system in the mixed Nash equilibrium, as a
function of the number of validators and their stake sizes. Our results provide
lower and upper bounds on the optimal number of validators. More concretely, a
minimal feasible number of validators minimizes the probability of failure. The
framework also allows to calculate optimum stake sizes, depending on the target
function. In the end, we discuss optimal design of rewards by the protocol for
validators.</abstract><doi>10.48550/arxiv.2308.02880</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext_linktorsrc |
| identifier | DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2308.02880 |
| ispartof | |
| issn | |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_arxiv_primary_2308_02880 |
| source | arXiv.org |
| subjects | Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Computer Science - Cryptography and Security |
| title | Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-01T04%3A57%3A01IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-arxiv_GOX&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Incentive%20Schemes%20for%20Rollup%20Validators&rft.au=Mamageishvili,%20Akaki&rft.date=2023-08-05&rft_id=info:doi/10.48550/arxiv.2308.02880&rft_dat=%3Carxiv_GOX%3E2308_02880%3C/arxiv_GOX%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |