Quantum key distribution component loopholes in 1500-2100 nm range perspective for Trojan-horse attacks
Vulnerabilities of components used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems affect its implementation security and must be taken into consideration during system development and security analysis. In this paper, we investigated transmission of fiber optical elements, which are commonly used in QKD...
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| creator | Nasedkin, Boris Kiselev, Fedor Filipov, Ilya Tolochko, Darya Ismagilov, Azat Chistiakov, Vladimir Gaidash, Andrei Tcypkin, Anton Kozubov, Anton Egorov, Vladimir |
| description | Vulnerabilities of components used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems affect its implementation security and must be taken into consideration during system development and security analysis. In this paper, we investigated transmission of fiber optical elements, which are commonly used in QKD systems for designing countermeasures against Trojan-horse attacks, in 1500-2100 nm range. As a result, we found loopholes in their transmission spectra which open possibilities for eavesdropping. We also suggested a simple passive countermeasure based on violation of total internal reflection in single-mode fiber, that leads to additional insertion losses of at least 60 dB for double-pass Trojan-horse probe pulses for wavelengths longer than 1830 nm. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.2211.16815 |
| format | Article |
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| subjects | Eavesdropping Fiber optics Horses Insertion loss Optical components Physics - Quantum Physics Quantum cryptography Security |
| title | Quantum key distribution component loopholes in 1500-2100 nm range perspective for Trojan-horse attacks |
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