InviCloak: An End-to-End Approach to Privacy and Performance in Web Content Distribution
In today's web ecosystem, a website that uses a Content Delivery Network (CDN) shares its Transport Layer Security (TLS) private key or session key with the CDN. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of InviCloak, a system that protects the confidentiality and integrity of a u...
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description | In today's web ecosystem, a website that uses a Content Delivery Network (CDN) shares its Transport Layer Security (TLS) private key or session key with the CDN. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of InviCloak, a system that protects the confidentiality and integrity of a user and a website's private communications without changing TLS or upgrading a CDN. InviCloak builds a lightweight but secure and practical key distribution mechanism using the existing DNS infrastructure to distribute a new public key associated with a website's domain name. A web client and a website can use the new key pair to build an encryption channel inside TLS. InviCloak accommodates the current web ecosystem. A website can deploy InviCloak unilaterally without a client's involvement to prevent a passive attacker inside a CDN from eavesdropping on their communications. If a client also installs InviCloak's browser extension, the client and the website can achieve end-to-end confidential and untampered communications in the presence of an active attacker inside a CDN. Our evaluation shows that InviCloak increases the median page load times (PLTs) of realistic web pages from 2.0s to 2.1s, which is smaller than the median PLTs (2.8s) of a state-of-the-art TEE-based solution. |
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subjects | Computer Science - Cryptography and Security Computer Science - Networking and Internet Architecture Content delivery networks Cryptography Domain names Eavesdropping Encryption Privacy Websites |
title | InviCloak: An End-to-End Approach to Privacy and Performance in Web Content Distribution |
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