Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing
In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns, and has been ad...
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| creator | Shen, Lijiong Kurtsiefer, Christian |
| description | In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices
open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology.
Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to
blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns, and has been addressed
both by technical means as well as advanced protocols. In this work, we present
a countermeasure against such attacks based on self-testing of detectors to
confirm their intended operation without relying on specific aspects of their
inner working, and to reveal any manipulation attempts. We experimentally
demonstrate this countermeasure with a typical InGaAs avalanche photodetector,
but the scheme can be easily implemented with any single photon detector. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.2204.06155 |
| format | Article |
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open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology.
Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to
blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns, and has been addressed
both by technical means as well as advanced protocols. In this work, we present
a countermeasure against such attacks based on self-testing of detectors to
confirm their intended operation without relying on specific aspects of their
inner working, and to reveal any manipulation attempts. We experimentally
demonstrate this countermeasure with a typical InGaAs avalanche photodetector,
but the scheme can be easily implemented with any single photon detector.</description><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2204.06155</identifier><language>eng</language><subject>Physics - Quantum Physics</subject><creationdate>2022-04</creationdate><rights>http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,778,883</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2204.06155$$EView_record_in_Cornell_University$$FView_record_in_$$GCornell_University$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2204.06155$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Shen, Lijiong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kurtsiefer, Christian</creatorcontrib><title>Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing</title><description>In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices
open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology.
Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to
blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns, and has been addressed
both by technical means as well as advanced protocols. In this work, we present
a countermeasure against such attacks based on self-testing of detectors to
confirm their intended operation without relying on specific aspects of their
inner working, and to reveal any manipulation attempts. We experimentally
demonstrate this countermeasure with a typical InGaAs avalanche photodetector,
but the scheme can be easily implemented with any single photon detector.</description><subject>Physics - Quantum Physics</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2022</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNpFj7tOwzAYRr0woMIDMOEXSPDd7ogiblIllu7RX8duLWK7ODaCtwdaJKZvOd-RDkI3lPTCSEnuoHyGj54xInqiqJSXaBxyS9WVkPZ4ctXZmguOkMKxzVBDThhqBfu24JDwe4NUW8Q2x9hSsGegHkpu-8P_fXGz76pb6o_0Cl14mBd3_bcrtH182A7P3eb16WW433SgtOz42oOZ7Br8pBns2M4bAcwLSiehvaZEESmEl4QpZQRnmjEghHDFDAdlJF-h27P2VDgeS4hQvsbf0vFUyr8BxBtPyg</recordid><startdate>20220412</startdate><enddate>20220412</enddate><creator>Shen, Lijiong</creator><creator>Kurtsiefer, Christian</creator><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20220412</creationdate><title>Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing</title><author>Shen, Lijiong ; Kurtsiefer, Christian</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a675-39fa8dc9afd72ab2bf84a2f411d47f71060544f502668432722a00036283a6853</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2022</creationdate><topic>Physics - Quantum Physics</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Shen, Lijiong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kurtsiefer, Christian</creatorcontrib><collection>arXiv.org</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Shen, Lijiong</au><au>Kurtsiefer, Christian</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing</atitle><date>2022-04-12</date><risdate>2022</risdate><abstract>In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices
open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology.
Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to
blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns, and has been addressed
both by technical means as well as advanced protocols. In this work, we present
a countermeasure against such attacks based on self-testing of detectors to
confirm their intended operation without relying on specific aspects of their
inner working, and to reveal any manipulation attempts. We experimentally
demonstrate this countermeasure with a typical InGaAs avalanche photodetector,
but the scheme can be easily implemented with any single photon detector.</abstract><doi>10.48550/arxiv.2204.06155</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| subjects | Physics - Quantum Physics |
| title | Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing |
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