VerLoc: Verifiable Localization in Decentralized Systems
We tackle the challenge of reliably determining the geo-location of nodes in decentralized networks, considering adversarial settings and without depending on any trusted landmarks. In particular, we consider active adversaries that control a subset of nodes, announce false locations and strategical...
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| creator | Kohls, Katharina Diaz, Claudia |
| description | We tackle the challenge of reliably determining the geo-location of nodes in
decentralized networks, considering adversarial settings and without depending
on any trusted landmarks. In particular, we consider active adversaries that
control a subset of nodes, announce false locations and strategically
manipulate measurements. To address this problem we propose, implement and
evaluate VerLoc, a system that allows verifying the claimed geo-locations of
network nodes in a fully decentralized manner. VerLoc securely schedules
roundtrip time (RTT) measurements between randomly chosen pairs of nodes.
Trilateration is then applied to the set of measurements to verify claimed
geo-locations. We evaluate VerLoc both with simulations and in the wild using a
prototype implementation integrated in the Nym network (currently run by
thousands of nodes). We find that VerLoc can localize nodes in the wild with a
median error of 60 km, and that in attack simulations it is capable of
detecting and filtering out adversarial timing manipulations for network setups
with up to 20 % malicious nodes. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.2105.11928 |
| format | Article |
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decentralized networks, considering adversarial settings and without depending
on any trusted landmarks. In particular, we consider active adversaries that
control a subset of nodes, announce false locations and strategically
manipulate measurements. To address this problem we propose, implement and
evaluate VerLoc, a system that allows verifying the claimed geo-locations of
network nodes in a fully decentralized manner. VerLoc securely schedules
roundtrip time (RTT) measurements between randomly chosen pairs of nodes.
Trilateration is then applied to the set of measurements to verify claimed
geo-locations. We evaluate VerLoc both with simulations and in the wild using a
prototype implementation integrated in the Nym network (currently run by
thousands of nodes). We find that VerLoc can localize nodes in the wild with a
median error of 60 km, and that in attack simulations it is capable of
detecting and filtering out adversarial timing manipulations for network setups
with up to 20 % malicious nodes.</description><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2105.11928</identifier><language>eng</language><subject>Computer Science - Cryptography and Security</subject><creationdate>2021-05</creationdate><rights>http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,780,885</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2105.11928$$EView_record_in_Cornell_University$$FView_record_in_$$GCornell_University$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2105.11928$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Kohls, Katharina</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Diaz, Claudia</creatorcontrib><title>VerLoc: Verifiable Localization in Decentralized Systems</title><description>We tackle the challenge of reliably determining the geo-location of nodes in
decentralized networks, considering adversarial settings and without depending
on any trusted landmarks. In particular, we consider active adversaries that
control a subset of nodes, announce false locations and strategically
manipulate measurements. To address this problem we propose, implement and
evaluate VerLoc, a system that allows verifying the claimed geo-locations of
network nodes in a fully decentralized manner. VerLoc securely schedules
roundtrip time (RTT) measurements between randomly chosen pairs of nodes.
Trilateration is then applied to the set of measurements to verify claimed
geo-locations. We evaluate VerLoc both with simulations and in the wild using a
prototype implementation integrated in the Nym network (currently run by
thousands of nodes). We find that VerLoc can localize nodes in the wild with a
median error of 60 km, and that in attack simulations it is capable of
detecting and filtering out adversarial timing manipulations for network setups
with up to 20 % malicious nodes.</description><subject>Computer Science - Cryptography and Security</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNotj71uwjAUhb10QJQHYKpfIKkd_9y4W0WBIkViKOoaXds3kqUQKieqSp--QJk-nTMcnY-xpRSlro0Rz5h_0ndZSWFKKV1Vz1j9Sbk5hRd-YeoS-p74JWOffnFKp4Gngb9RoGHK144i_ziPEx3HR_bQYT_S4s45O2zWh9V70ey3u9VrU6CFulDeI6B2OlpnnSZwUToUnbeVjj4KD4aUBA_UxWDABSI0FiAYdGAVqjl7-p-9XW-_cjpiPrdXhfamoP4Au2xBgA</recordid><startdate>20210525</startdate><enddate>20210525</enddate><creator>Kohls, Katharina</creator><creator>Diaz, Claudia</creator><scope>AKY</scope><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20210525</creationdate><title>VerLoc: Verifiable Localization in Decentralized Systems</title><author>Kohls, Katharina ; Diaz, Claudia</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a678-3bba7a494d69694e79d19a0fb624dbd0b75e317b7efdc579ceea5677c5a9763a3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Computer Science - Cryptography and Security</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Kohls, Katharina</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Diaz, Claudia</creatorcontrib><collection>arXiv Computer Science</collection><collection>arXiv.org</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Kohls, Katharina</au><au>Diaz, Claudia</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>VerLoc: Verifiable Localization in Decentralized Systems</atitle><date>2021-05-25</date><risdate>2021</risdate><abstract>We tackle the challenge of reliably determining the geo-location of nodes in
decentralized networks, considering adversarial settings and without depending
on any trusted landmarks. In particular, we consider active adversaries that
control a subset of nodes, announce false locations and strategically
manipulate measurements. To address this problem we propose, implement and
evaluate VerLoc, a system that allows verifying the claimed geo-locations of
network nodes in a fully decentralized manner. VerLoc securely schedules
roundtrip time (RTT) measurements between randomly chosen pairs of nodes.
Trilateration is then applied to the set of measurements to verify claimed
geo-locations. We evaluate VerLoc both with simulations and in the wild using a
prototype implementation integrated in the Nym network (currently run by
thousands of nodes). We find that VerLoc can localize nodes in the wild with a
median error of 60 km, and that in attack simulations it is capable of
detecting and filtering out adversarial timing manipulations for network setups
with up to 20 % malicious nodes.</abstract><doi>10.48550/arxiv.2105.11928</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| identifier | DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2105.11928 |
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| subjects | Computer Science - Cryptography and Security |
| title | VerLoc: Verifiable Localization in Decentralized Systems |
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