Evolutionary Game Theory Squared: Evolving Agents in Endogenously Evolving Zero-Sum Games

The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away from the artificial divide between dynamic agents and static g...

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Hauptverfasser:	Skoulakis, Stratis, Fiez, Tanner, Sim, Ryann, Piliouras, Georgios, Ratliff, Lillian
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Computer Science - Learning Computer Science - Multiagent Systems
Online-Zugang:	Volltext bestellen
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