Screening for breakthroughs
We identify a new dynamic agency problem: that of incentivising the prompt disclosure of productive information. To study it, we introduce a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclos...
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| creator | Curello, Gregorio Sinander, Ludvig |
| description | We identify a new dynamic agency problem: that of incentivising the prompt
disclosure of productive information. To study it, we introduce a general model
in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is
privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via
her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline
structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an
important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply
our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.2011.10090 |
| format | Article |
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disclosure of productive information. To study it, we introduce a general model
in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is
privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via
her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline
structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an
important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply
our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.</description><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2011.10090</identifier><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020-11</creationdate><rights>http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,776,881</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2011.10090$$EView_record_in_Cornell_University$$FView_record_in_$$GCornell_University$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2011.10090$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Curello, Gregorio</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sinander, Ludvig</creatorcontrib><title>Screening for breakthroughs</title><description>We identify a new dynamic agency problem: that of incentivising the prompt
disclosure of productive information. To study it, we introduce a general model
in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is
privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via
her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline
structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an
important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply
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disclosure of productive information. To study it, we introduce a general model
in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is
privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via
her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline
structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an
important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply
our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.</abstract><doi>10.48550/arxiv.2011.10090</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| title | Screening for breakthroughs |
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