Automatic Detection of Influential Actors in Disinformation Networks
The weaponization of digital communications and social media to conduct disinformation campaigns at immense scale, speed, and reach presents new challenges to identify and counter hostile influence operations (IOs). This paper presents an end-to-end framework to automate detection of disinformation...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | arXiv.org 2021-01 |
---|---|
Hauptverfasser: | , , , , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | |
---|---|
container_issue | |
container_start_page | |
container_title | arXiv.org |
container_volume | |
creator | Smith, Steven T Kao, Edward K Mackin, Erika D Shah, Danelle C Simek, Olga Rubin, Donald B |
description | The weaponization of digital communications and social media to conduct disinformation campaigns at immense scale, speed, and reach presents new challenges to identify and counter hostile influence operations (IOs). This paper presents an end-to-end framework to automate detection of disinformation narratives, networks, and influential actors. The framework integrates natural language processing, machine learning, graph analytics, and a novel network causal inference approach to quantify the impact of individual actors in spreading IO narratives. We demonstrate its capability on real-world hostile IO campaigns with Twitter datasets collected during the 2017 French presidential elections, and known IO accounts disclosed by Twitter over a broad range of IO campaigns (May 2007 to February 2020), over 50,000 accounts, 17 countries, and different account types including both trolls and bots. Our system detects IO accounts with 96% precision, 79% recall, and 96% area-under-the-PR-curve, maps out salient network communities, and discovers high-impact accounts that escape the lens of traditional impact statistics based on activity counts and network centrality. Results are corroborated with independent sources of known IO accounts from U.S. Congressional reports, investigative journalism, and IO datasets provided by Twitter. |
doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.2005.10879 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_arxiv</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_arxiv_primary_2005_10879</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2406415295</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-a525-b5491eea47fb30f708b469ece801524768e08d0625309bd0cfe12463319e20193</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotj8tOwzAQRS0kJKrSD2BFJNYJ41diL6OWR6UKNt1HTjqWXNK42A6PvydtWd3NuTP3EHJHoRBKSng04cd9FQxAFhRUpa_IjHFOcyUYuyGLGPcAwMqKSclnZFWPyR9Mcl22woRdcn7IvM3Wg-1HHJIzfVZ3yYeYuSFbuegG68OpMHFvmL59-Ii35NqaPuLiP-dk-_y0Xb7mm_eX9bLe5EYymbdSaIpoRGVbDrYC1YpSY4cKqGSiKhWC2kHJJAfd7qCzSJkop-0aGVDN5-T-cvas2ByDO5jw25xUm7PqRDxciGPwnyPG1Oz9GIZpU8MElGL6oyX_A3azVZM</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2406415295</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Automatic Detection of Influential Actors in Disinformation Networks</title><source>arXiv.org</source><source>Free E- Journals</source><creator>Smith, Steven T ; Kao, Edward K ; Mackin, Erika D ; Shah, Danelle C ; Simek, Olga ; Rubin, Donald B</creator><creatorcontrib>Smith, Steven T ; Kao, Edward K ; Mackin, Erika D ; Shah, Danelle C ; Simek, Olga ; Rubin, Donald B</creatorcontrib><description>The weaponization of digital communications and social media to conduct disinformation campaigns at immense scale, speed, and reach presents new challenges to identify and counter hostile influence operations (IOs). This paper presents an end-to-end framework to automate detection of disinformation narratives, networks, and influential actors. The framework integrates natural language processing, machine learning, graph analytics, and a novel network causal inference approach to quantify the impact of individual actors in spreading IO narratives. We demonstrate its capability on real-world hostile IO campaigns with Twitter datasets collected during the 2017 French presidential elections, and known IO accounts disclosed by Twitter over a broad range of IO campaigns (May 2007 to February 2020), over 50,000 accounts, 17 countries, and different account types including both trolls and bots. Our system detects IO accounts with 96% precision, 79% recall, and 96% area-under-the-PR-curve, maps out salient network communities, and discovers high-impact accounts that escape the lens of traditional impact statistics based on activity counts and network centrality. Results are corroborated with independent sources of known IO accounts from U.S. Congressional reports, investigative journalism, and IO datasets provided by Twitter.</description><identifier>EISSN: 2331-8422</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2005.10879</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Ithaca: Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</publisher><subject>Computer Science - Learning ; Computer Science - Social and Information Networks ; Congressional reports ; Datasets ; Digital media ; Election results ; Elections ; Information warfare ; Machine learning ; Narratives ; Natural language processing ; Presidential elections ; Statistics - Applications ; Statistics - Machine Learning</subject><ispartof>arXiv.org, 2021-01</ispartof><rights>2021. This work is published under http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><rights>http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,776,780,881,27902</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2011216118$$DView published paper (Access to full text may be restricted)$$Hfree_for_read</backlink><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2005.10879$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Smith, Steven T</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kao, Edward K</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mackin, Erika D</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Shah, Danelle C</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Simek, Olga</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rubin, Donald B</creatorcontrib><title>Automatic Detection of Influential Actors in Disinformation Networks</title><title>arXiv.org</title><description>The weaponization of digital communications and social media to conduct disinformation campaigns at immense scale, speed, and reach presents new challenges to identify and counter hostile influence operations (IOs). This paper presents an end-to-end framework to automate detection of disinformation narratives, networks, and influential actors. The framework integrates natural language processing, machine learning, graph analytics, and a novel network causal inference approach to quantify the impact of individual actors in spreading IO narratives. We demonstrate its capability on real-world hostile IO campaigns with Twitter datasets collected during the 2017 French presidential elections, and known IO accounts disclosed by Twitter over a broad range of IO campaigns (May 2007 to February 2020), over 50,000 accounts, 17 countries, and different account types including both trolls and bots. Our system detects IO accounts with 96% precision, 79% recall, and 96% area-under-the-PR-curve, maps out salient network communities, and discovers high-impact accounts that escape the lens of traditional impact statistics based on activity counts and network centrality. Results are corroborated with independent sources of known IO accounts from U.S. Congressional reports, investigative journalism, and IO datasets provided by Twitter.</description><subject>Computer Science - Learning</subject><subject>Computer Science - Social and Information Networks</subject><subject>Congressional reports</subject><subject>Datasets</subject><subject>Digital media</subject><subject>Election results</subject><subject>Elections</subject><subject>Information warfare</subject><subject>Machine learning</subject><subject>Narratives</subject><subject>Natural language processing</subject><subject>Presidential elections</subject><subject>Statistics - Applications</subject><subject>Statistics - Machine Learning</subject><issn>2331-8422</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNotj8tOwzAQRS0kJKrSD2BFJNYJ41diL6OWR6UKNt1HTjqWXNK42A6PvydtWd3NuTP3EHJHoRBKSng04cd9FQxAFhRUpa_IjHFOcyUYuyGLGPcAwMqKSclnZFWPyR9Mcl22woRdcn7IvM3Wg-1HHJIzfVZ3yYeYuSFbuegG68OpMHFvmL59-Ii35NqaPuLiP-dk-_y0Xb7mm_eX9bLe5EYymbdSaIpoRGVbDrYC1YpSY4cKqGSiKhWC2kHJJAfd7qCzSJkop-0aGVDN5-T-cvas2ByDO5jw25xUm7PqRDxciGPwnyPG1Oz9GIZpU8MElGL6oyX_A3azVZM</recordid><startdate>20210107</startdate><enddate>20210107</enddate><creator>Smith, Steven T</creator><creator>Kao, Edward K</creator><creator>Mackin, Erika D</creator><creator>Shah, Danelle C</creator><creator>Simek, Olga</creator><creator>Rubin, Donald B</creator><general>Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</general><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><scope>AKY</scope><scope>EPD</scope><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20210107</creationdate><title>Automatic Detection of Influential Actors in Disinformation Networks</title><author>Smith, Steven T ; Kao, Edward K ; Mackin, Erika D ; Shah, Danelle C ; Simek, Olga ; Rubin, Donald B</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a525-b5491eea47fb30f708b469ece801524768e08d0625309bd0cfe12463319e20193</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Computer Science - Learning</topic><topic>Computer Science - Social and Information Networks</topic><topic>Congressional reports</topic><topic>Datasets</topic><topic>Digital media</topic><topic>Election results</topic><topic>Elections</topic><topic>Information warfare</topic><topic>Machine learning</topic><topic>Narratives</topic><topic>Natural language processing</topic><topic>Presidential elections</topic><topic>Statistics - Applications</topic><topic>Statistics - Machine Learning</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Smith, Steven T</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kao, Edward K</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mackin, Erika D</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Shah, Danelle C</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Simek, Olga</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rubin, Donald B</creatorcontrib><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>Materials Science & Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Publicly Available Content Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>Engineering Collection</collection><collection>arXiv Computer Science</collection><collection>arXiv Statistics</collection><collection>arXiv.org</collection><jtitle>arXiv.org</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Smith, Steven T</au><au>Kao, Edward K</au><au>Mackin, Erika D</au><au>Shah, Danelle C</au><au>Simek, Olga</au><au>Rubin, Donald B</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Automatic Detection of Influential Actors in Disinformation Networks</atitle><jtitle>arXiv.org</jtitle><date>2021-01-07</date><risdate>2021</risdate><eissn>2331-8422</eissn><abstract>The weaponization of digital communications and social media to conduct disinformation campaigns at immense scale, speed, and reach presents new challenges to identify and counter hostile influence operations (IOs). This paper presents an end-to-end framework to automate detection of disinformation narratives, networks, and influential actors. The framework integrates natural language processing, machine learning, graph analytics, and a novel network causal inference approach to quantify the impact of individual actors in spreading IO narratives. We demonstrate its capability on real-world hostile IO campaigns with Twitter datasets collected during the 2017 French presidential elections, and known IO accounts disclosed by Twitter over a broad range of IO campaigns (May 2007 to February 2020), over 50,000 accounts, 17 countries, and different account types including both trolls and bots. Our system detects IO accounts with 96% precision, 79% recall, and 96% area-under-the-PR-curve, maps out salient network communities, and discovers high-impact accounts that escape the lens of traditional impact statistics based on activity counts and network centrality. Results are corroborated with independent sources of known IO accounts from U.S. Congressional reports, investigative journalism, and IO datasets provided by Twitter.</abstract><cop>Ithaca</cop><pub>Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</pub><doi>10.48550/arxiv.2005.10879</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | EISSN: 2331-8422 |
ispartof | arXiv.org, 2021-01 |
issn | 2331-8422 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_arxiv_primary_2005_10879 |
source | arXiv.org; Free E- Journals |
subjects | Computer Science - Learning Computer Science - Social and Information Networks Congressional reports Datasets Digital media Election results Elections Information warfare Machine learning Narratives Natural language processing Presidential elections Statistics - Applications Statistics - Machine Learning |
title | Automatic Detection of Influential Actors in Disinformation Networks |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-31T13%3A36%3A17IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_arxiv&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Automatic%20Detection%20of%20Influential%20Actors%20in%20Disinformation%20Networks&rft.jtitle=arXiv.org&rft.au=Smith,%20Steven%20T&rft.date=2021-01-07&rft.eissn=2331-8422&rft_id=info:doi/10.48550/arxiv.2005.10879&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_arxiv%3E2406415295%3C/proquest_arxiv%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2406415295&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |