Last Round Convergence and No-Instant Regret in Repeated Games with Asymmetric Information

Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 2021 This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of the game. Suppo...

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Hauptverfasser:	Dinh, Le Cong, Tran-Thanh, Long, Nguyen, Tri-Dung, Zemkoho, Alain B
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
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