Robust perfect equilibrium in large games

Robust perfect equilibrium in large games

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and in pure strategies) and satisfy the importa...

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Hauptverfasser: Chen, Enxian, Qiao, Lei, Sun, Xiang, Sun, Yeneng
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Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
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Sun, Yeneng
description This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and in pure strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number of agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games and potential games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium.
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title Robust perfect equilibrium in large games
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