Decentralized Common Knowledge Oracles
We define and analyze three mechanisms for getting common knowledge, a posteriori truths about the world onto a blockchain in a decentralized setting. We show that, when a reasonable economic condition is met, these mechanisms are individually rational, incentive compatible, and decide the true outc...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | arXiv.org 2019-12 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | |
|---|---|
| container_issue | |
| container_start_page | |
| container_title | arXiv.org |
| container_volume | |
| creator | Williams, Austin K Peterson, Jack |
| description | We define and analyze three mechanisms for getting common knowledge, a posteriori truths about the world onto a blockchain in a decentralized setting. We show that, when a reasonable economic condition is met, these mechanisms are individually rational, incentive compatible, and decide the true outcome of valid oracle queries in both the non-cooperative and cooperative settings. These mechanisms are based upon repeated games with two classes of players: queriers who desire to get common knowledge truths onto the blockchain and a pool of reporters who posses such common knowledge. Presented with a new oracle query, reporters have an opportunity to report the truth in return for a fee provided by the querier. During subsequent oracle queries, the querier has an opportunity to punish any reporters who did not report truthfully during previous rounds. While the set of reporters has the power to cause the oracle to lie, they are incentivized not to do so. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.1912.01215 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_arxiv</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_arxiv_primary_1912_01215</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2321241343</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-a523-5dc098932e7715355c5c9f40e5e1c383c6e3c07a880417e9f80b65993fa65623</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotj0tLw0AURgdBsNT-AFcGBHepc--dm8wsJT6x0IXuwzi5kZQ86qT19eutratvc_g4R6kz0HNjmfWVj1_Nxxwc4FwDAh-pCRJBag3iiZqN40prjVmOzDRRlzcSpN9E3zY_UiXF0HVDnzz1w2cr1Zsky-hDK-OpOq59O8rsf6fq-e72pXhIF8v7x-J6kXpGSrkK2llHKHkOTMyBg6uNFhYIZClkQkHn3lptIBdXW_2asXNU-4wzpKk6P7zuG8p1bDofv8u_lnLfsiMuDsQ6Du9bGTflatjGfqdUIiGgATJEv3P-SaM</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2321241343</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Decentralized Common Knowledge Oracles</title><source>arXiv.org</source><source>Free E- Journals</source><creator>Williams, Austin K ; Peterson, Jack</creator><creatorcontrib>Williams, Austin K ; Peterson, Jack</creatorcontrib><description>We define and analyze three mechanisms for getting common knowledge, a posteriori truths about the world onto a blockchain in a decentralized setting. We show that, when a reasonable economic condition is met, these mechanisms are individually rational, incentive compatible, and decide the true outcome of valid oracle queries in both the non-cooperative and cooperative settings. These mechanisms are based upon repeated games with two classes of players: queriers who desire to get common knowledge truths onto the blockchain and a pool of reporters who posses such common knowledge. Presented with a new oracle query, reporters have an opportunity to report the truth in return for a fee provided by the querier. During subsequent oracle queries, the querier has an opportunity to punish any reporters who did not report truthfully during previous rounds. While the set of reporters has the power to cause the oracle to lie, they are incentivized not to do so.</description><identifier>EISSN: 2331-8422</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1912.01215</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Ithaca: Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</publisher><subject>Blockchain ; Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory ; Computer Science - Cryptography and Security ; Cryptography ; Economic conditions ; Game theory ; Queries</subject><ispartof>arXiv.org, 2019-12</ispartof><rights>2019. This work is published under http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><rights>http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,776,780,881,27902</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1912.01215$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.5195/ledger.2019.166$$DView published paper (Access to full text may be restricted)$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Williams, Austin K</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Peterson, Jack</creatorcontrib><title>Decentralized Common Knowledge Oracles</title><title>arXiv.org</title><description>We define and analyze three mechanisms for getting common knowledge, a posteriori truths about the world onto a blockchain in a decentralized setting. We show that, when a reasonable economic condition is met, these mechanisms are individually rational, incentive compatible, and decide the true outcome of valid oracle queries in both the non-cooperative and cooperative settings. These mechanisms are based upon repeated games with two classes of players: queriers who desire to get common knowledge truths onto the blockchain and a pool of reporters who posses such common knowledge. Presented with a new oracle query, reporters have an opportunity to report the truth in return for a fee provided by the querier. During subsequent oracle queries, the querier has an opportunity to punish any reporters who did not report truthfully during previous rounds. While the set of reporters has the power to cause the oracle to lie, they are incentivized not to do so.</description><subject>Blockchain</subject><subject>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</subject><subject>Computer Science - Cryptography and Security</subject><subject>Cryptography</subject><subject>Economic conditions</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Queries</subject><issn>2331-8422</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2019</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNotj0tLw0AURgdBsNT-AFcGBHepc--dm8wsJT6x0IXuwzi5kZQ86qT19eutratvc_g4R6kz0HNjmfWVj1_Nxxwc4FwDAh-pCRJBag3iiZqN40prjVmOzDRRlzcSpN9E3zY_UiXF0HVDnzz1w2cr1Zsky-hDK-OpOq59O8rsf6fq-e72pXhIF8v7x-J6kXpGSrkK2llHKHkOTMyBg6uNFhYIZClkQkHn3lptIBdXW_2asXNU-4wzpKk6P7zuG8p1bDofv8u_lnLfsiMuDsQ6Du9bGTflatjGfqdUIiGgATJEv3P-SaM</recordid><startdate>20191203</startdate><enddate>20191203</enddate><creator>Williams, Austin K</creator><creator>Peterson, Jack</creator><general>Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</general><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><scope>AKY</scope><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20191203</creationdate><title>Decentralized Common Knowledge Oracles</title><author>Williams, Austin K ; Peterson, Jack</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a523-5dc098932e7715355c5c9f40e5e1c383c6e3c07a880417e9f80b65993fa65623</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2019</creationdate><topic>Blockchain</topic><topic>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</topic><topic>Computer Science - Cryptography and Security</topic><topic>Cryptography</topic><topic>Economic conditions</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Queries</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Williams, Austin K</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Peterson, Jack</creatorcontrib><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>Materials Science & Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Publicly Available Content Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>Engineering Collection</collection><collection>arXiv Computer Science</collection><collection>arXiv.org</collection><jtitle>arXiv.org</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Williams, Austin K</au><au>Peterson, Jack</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Decentralized Common Knowledge Oracles</atitle><jtitle>arXiv.org</jtitle><date>2019-12-03</date><risdate>2019</risdate><eissn>2331-8422</eissn><abstract>We define and analyze three mechanisms for getting common knowledge, a posteriori truths about the world onto a blockchain in a decentralized setting. We show that, when a reasonable economic condition is met, these mechanisms are individually rational, incentive compatible, and decide the true outcome of valid oracle queries in both the non-cooperative and cooperative settings. These mechanisms are based upon repeated games with two classes of players: queriers who desire to get common knowledge truths onto the blockchain and a pool of reporters who posses such common knowledge. Presented with a new oracle query, reporters have an opportunity to report the truth in return for a fee provided by the querier. During subsequent oracle queries, the querier has an opportunity to punish any reporters who did not report truthfully during previous rounds. While the set of reporters has the power to cause the oracle to lie, they are incentivized not to do so.</abstract><cop>Ithaca</cop><pub>Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</pub><doi>10.48550/arxiv.1912.01215</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | EISSN: 2331-8422 |
| ispartof | arXiv.org, 2019-12 |
| issn | 2331-8422 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_arxiv_primary_1912_01215 |
| source | arXiv.org; Free E- Journals |
| subjects | Blockchain Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Computer Science - Cryptography and Security Cryptography Economic conditions Game theory Queries |
| title | Decentralized Common Knowledge Oracles |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-30T00%3A50%3A00IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_arxiv&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Decentralized%20Common%20Knowledge%20Oracles&rft.jtitle=arXiv.org&rft.au=Williams,%20Austin%20K&rft.date=2019-12-03&rft.eissn=2331-8422&rft_id=info:doi/10.48550/arxiv.1912.01215&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_arxiv%3E2321241343%3C/proquest_arxiv%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2321241343&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |