Comparing the Effects of DNS, DoT, and DoH on Web Performance
Nearly every service on the Internet relies on the Domain Name System (DNS), which translates a human-readable name to an IP address before two endpoints can communicate. Today, DNS traffic is unencrypted, leaving users vulnerable to eavesdropping and tampering. Past work has demonstrated that DNS q...
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description | Nearly every service on the Internet relies on the Domain Name System (DNS), which translates a human-readable name to an IP address before two endpoints can communicate. Today, DNS traffic is unencrypted, leaving users vulnerable to eavesdropping and tampering. Past work has demonstrated that DNS queries can reveal a user's browsing history and even what smart devices they are using at home. In response to these privacy concerns, two new protocols have been proposed: DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) and DNS-over-TLS (DoT). Instead of sending DNS queries and responses in the clear, DoH and DoT establish encrypted connections between users and resolvers. By doing so, these protocols provide privacy and security guarantees that traditional DNS (Do53) lacks. In this paper, we measure the effect of Do53, DoT, and DoH on query response times and page load times from five global vantage points. We find that although DoH and DoT response times are generally higher than Do53, both protocols can perform better than Do53 in terms of page load times. However, as throughput decreases and substantial packet loss and latency are introduced, web pages load fastest with Do53. Additionally, web pages successfully load more often with Do53 and DoT than DoH. Based on these results, we provide several recommendations to improve DNS performance, such as opportunistic partial responses and wire format caching. |
doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.1907.08089 |
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subjects | Browsing Caching Computer Science - Cryptography and Security Computer Science - Networking and Internet Architecture Cost benefit analysis Domain names Eavesdropping IP (Internet Protocol) Load Protocol (computers) Queries Resolvers Smart buildings TCP-IP |
title | Comparing the Effects of DNS, DoT, and DoH on Web Performance |
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