Augur: a decentralized oracle and prediction market platform
Augur is a trustless, decentralized oracle and platform for prediction markets. The outcomes of Augur's prediction markets are chosen by users that hold Augur's native Reputation token, who stake their tokens on the actual observed outcome and, in return, receive settlement fees from the m...
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description | Augur is a trustless, decentralized oracle and platform for prediction markets. The outcomes of Augur's prediction markets are chosen by users that hold Augur's native Reputation token, who stake their tokens on the actual observed outcome and, in return, receive settlement fees from the markets. Augur's incentive structure is designed to ensure that honest, accurate reporting of outcomes is always the most profitable option for Reputation token holders. Token holders can post progressively-larger Reputation bonds to dispute proposed market outcomes. If the size of these bonds reaches a certain threshold, Reputation splits into multiple versions, one for each possible outcome of the disputed market; token holders must then exchange their Reputation tokens for one of these versions. Versions of Reputation which do not correspond to the real-world outcome will become worthless, as no one will participate in prediction markets unless they are confident that the markets will resolve correctly. Therefore, token holders will select the only version of Reputation which they know will continue to have value: the version that corresponds to reality. |
doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.1501.01042 |
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subjects | Computer Science - Cryptography and Security Markets Prediction markets Reputations |
title | Augur: a decentralized oracle and prediction market platform |
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