Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions
Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such that no agent can benefit from misreporting its arrival tim...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext bestellen |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | |
|---|---|
| container_issue | |
| container_start_page | |
| container_title | |
| container_volume | |
| creator | Bredin, Jonathan Parkes, David C |
| description | Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with
private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource
and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful
DAs, such that no agent can benefit from misreporting its arrival time,
duration, or value. The family of DAs is parameterized by a pricing rule, and
includes a generalization of McAfee's truthful DA to this dynamic setting. We
present an empirical study, in which we study the allocative-surplus and agent
surplus for a number of different DAs. Our results illustrate that dynamic
pricing rules are important to provide good market efficiency for markets with
high volatility or low volume. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.1207.1360 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>arxiv_GOX</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_arxiv_primary_1207_1360</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>1207_1360</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-a650-9b0bdcba506b31274c22d98b54f9e5aa2d07a2a409bf893706a5018e2dec408b3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotzjtvwjAYhWEvHSpg74Q8V0r4fEvsEVEulUAs2aPPsa1GMknlkAr-PbdOZ3l19BDywSCXWilYYLq0fznjUOZMFPBOPg-983GgoU-0SuP5J4yRHrvYdp5-9aONni7H5tz23TAlbwHj4Gf_OyHVZl2tdtn-uP1eLfcZFgoyY8G6xqKCwgrGS9lw7oy2SgbjFSJ3UCJHCcYGbUQJxT1l2nPnGwnaigmZv26f1vo3tSdM1_phrh9mcQPqvjr8</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Access Repository</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions</title><source>arXiv.org</source><creator>Bredin, Jonathan ; Parkes, David C</creator><creatorcontrib>Bredin, Jonathan ; Parkes, David C</creatorcontrib><description>Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with
private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource
and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful
DAs, such that no agent can benefit from misreporting its arrival time,
duration, or value. The family of DAs is parameterized by a pricing rule, and
includes a generalization of McAfee's truthful DA to this dynamic setting. We
present an empirical study, in which we study the allocative-surplus and agent
surplus for a number of different DAs. Our results illustrate that dynamic
pricing rules are important to provide good market efficiency for markets with
high volatility or low volume.</description><identifier>DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1207.1360</identifier><language>eng</language><subject>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</subject><creationdate>2012-07</creationdate><rights>http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>228,230,776,881</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://arxiv.org/abs/1207.1360$$EView_record_in_Cornell_University$$FView_record_in_$$GCornell_University$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1207.1360$$DView paper in arXiv$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Bredin, Jonathan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Parkes, David C</creatorcontrib><title>Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions</title><description>Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with
private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource
and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful
DAs, such that no agent can benefit from misreporting its arrival time,
duration, or value. The family of DAs is parameterized by a pricing rule, and
includes a generalization of McAfee's truthful DA to this dynamic setting. We
present an empirical study, in which we study the allocative-surplus and agent
surplus for a number of different DAs. Our results illustrate that dynamic
pricing rules are important to provide good market efficiency for markets with
high volatility or low volume.</description><subject>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNotzjtvwjAYhWEvHSpg74Q8V0r4fEvsEVEulUAs2aPPsa1GMknlkAr-PbdOZ3l19BDywSCXWilYYLq0fznjUOZMFPBOPg-983GgoU-0SuP5J4yRHrvYdp5-9aONni7H5tz23TAlbwHj4Gf_OyHVZl2tdtn-uP1eLfcZFgoyY8G6xqKCwgrGS9lw7oy2SgbjFSJ3UCJHCcYGbUQJxT1l2nPnGwnaigmZv26f1vo3tSdM1_phrh9mcQPqvjr8</recordid><startdate>20120704</startdate><enddate>20120704</enddate><creator>Bredin, Jonathan</creator><creator>Parkes, David C</creator><scope>AKY</scope><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20120704</creationdate><title>Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions</title><author>Bredin, Jonathan ; Parkes, David C</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a650-9b0bdcba506b31274c22d98b54f9e5aa2d07a2a409bf893706a5018e2dec408b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Bredin, Jonathan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Parkes, David C</creatorcontrib><collection>arXiv Computer Science</collection><collection>arXiv.org</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Bredin, Jonathan</au><au>Parkes, David C</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions</atitle><date>2012-07-04</date><risdate>2012</risdate><abstract>Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with
private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource
and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful
DAs, such that no agent can benefit from misreporting its arrival time,
duration, or value. The family of DAs is parameterized by a pricing rule, and
includes a generalization of McAfee's truthful DA to this dynamic setting. We
present an empirical study, in which we study the allocative-surplus and agent
surplus for a number of different DAs. Our results illustrate that dynamic
pricing rules are important to provide good market efficiency for markets with
high volatility or low volume.</abstract><doi>10.48550/arxiv.1207.1360</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext_linktorsrc |
| identifier | DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1207.1360 |
| ispartof | |
| issn | |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_arxiv_primary_1207_1360 |
| source | arXiv.org |
| subjects | Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory |
| title | Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-13T21%3A07%3A15IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-arxiv_GOX&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Models%20for%20Truthful%20Online%20Double%20Auctions&rft.au=Bredin,%20Jonathan&rft.date=2012-07-04&rft_id=info:doi/10.48550/arxiv.1207.1360&rft_dat=%3Carxiv_GOX%3E1207_1360%3C/arxiv_GOX%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |