Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passive...
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| creator | Sauge, Sebastien Lydersen, Lars Anisimov, Andrey Skaar, Johannes Makarov, Vadim |
| description | We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.48550/arxiv.0809.3408 |
| format | Article |
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Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. 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These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.</description><subject>Avalanche diodes</subject><subject>Detectors</subject><subject>Electric converters</subject><subject>Model testing</subject><subject>Photodiodes</subject><subject>Photon avalanches</subject><subject>Physics - Instrumentation and Detectors</subject><subject>Physics - Quantum Physics</subject><subject>Quantum cryptography</subject><subject>Quenching</subject><subject>Sensors</subject><subject>Stability</subject><subject>Voltage converters (DC to DC)</subject><issn>2331-8422</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2011</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GOX</sourceid><recordid>eNotjz1rwzAQhkWh0JBm71QEne2eJEuWxmL6EQh0yW5kWY4VXMmVlbT593WSDu-9wz0c9yD0QCAvJOfwrOOvO-YgQeWsAHmDFpQxksmC0ju0mqY9AFBRUs7ZAq2r4FMMw-D8DmuPtUnuaIdT9n2w3vS2xdO8GSwe-5CCx61N1qQQ8Y9LPW6i2_UJD-d5j247PUx29d9LtH173VYf2ebzfV29bDLNico6QjU0ShnbNMIU1liuSiaAl4wZbWSj6JyGkJZQpYloSypByK6Q1FhhCVuix-vZi2Y9Rvel46k-69Zn3Rl4ugJjDLPElOp9OEQ_v1RTkEIpoFyxP53_WF4</recordid><startdate>20111023</startdate><enddate>20111023</enddate><creator>Sauge, Sebastien</creator><creator>Lydersen, Lars</creator><creator>Anisimov, Andrey</creator><creator>Skaar, Johannes</creator><creator>Makarov, Vadim</creator><general>Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</general><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><scope>GOX</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20111023</creationdate><title>Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light</title><author>Sauge, Sebastien ; Lydersen, Lars ; Anisimov, Andrey ; Skaar, Johannes ; Makarov, Vadim</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a519-f12a0b99cebb6c4ece5973605733cac8b928b9b11d129a16d728068f482ce6e13</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2011</creationdate><topic>Avalanche diodes</topic><topic>Detectors</topic><topic>Electric converters</topic><topic>Model testing</topic><topic>Photodiodes</topic><topic>Photon avalanches</topic><topic>Physics - Instrumentation and Detectors</topic><topic>Physics - Quantum Physics</topic><topic>Quantum cryptography</topic><topic>Quenching</topic><topic>Sensors</topic><topic>Stability</topic><topic>Voltage converters (DC to DC)</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Sauge, Sebastien</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lydersen, Lars</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Anisimov, Andrey</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Skaar, Johannes</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Makarov, Vadim</creatorcontrib><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>Materials Science & Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Access via ProQuest (Open Access)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>Engineering Collection</collection><collection>arXiv.org</collection><jtitle>arXiv.org</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Sauge, Sebastien</au><au>Lydersen, Lars</au><au>Anisimov, Andrey</au><au>Skaar, Johannes</au><au>Makarov, Vadim</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light</atitle><jtitle>arXiv.org</jtitle><date>2011-10-23</date><risdate>2011</risdate><eissn>2331-8422</eissn><abstract>We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.</abstract><cop>Ithaca</cop><pub>Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</pub><doi>10.48550/arxiv.0809.3408</doi><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| subjects | Avalanche diodes Detectors Electric converters Model testing Photodiodes Photon avalanches Physics - Instrumentation and Detectors Physics - Quantum Physics Quantum cryptography Quenching Sensors Stability Voltage converters (DC to DC) |
| title | Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light |
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