Fair division of graphs and of tangled cakes von Igarashi, Ayumi, Zwicker, William S.

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Cycles and Intractability in a Large Class of Aggregation Rules von Zwicker, William S.

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The Future of Economic Design: The Continuing Development of a Field as Envisioned by Its Researchers von Laslier, Jean-François, Moulin, Hervé, Sanver, M. Remzi, Zwicker, William S

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Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach von Duddy, Conal, Piggins, Ashley, Zwicker, William S.

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The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids von Houy, Nicolas, Zwicker, William S.

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Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval von Freixas, Josep, Zwicker, William S.

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Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules von Sanver, M. Remzi, Zwicker, William S.

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Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval von Freixas, Josep, Zwicker, William S.

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One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness von Sanver, M. Remzi, Zwicker, William S.

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Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles von Bilò, Vittorio, Caragiannis, Ioannis, Flammini, Michele, Igarashi, Ayumi, Monaco, Gianpiero, Peters, Dominik, Vinci, Cosimo, Zwicker, William S.

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Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings von Cervone, Davide P., Dai, Ronghua, Gnoutcheff, Daniel, Lanterman, Grant, Mackenzie, Andrew, Morse, Ari, Srivastava, Nikhil, Zwicker, William S.

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Coalition formation games with separable preferences von Burani, Nadia, Zwicker, William S.

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Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC? von CERVONE, Davide P, GEHRLEIN, William V, ZWICKER, William S

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Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? von Zwicker, William S.

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The paradox of multiple elections von Brams, Steven J., Kilgour, D. Marc, Zwicker, William S.

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Aggregation of binary evaluations: a borda-like approach von Duddy, Conal, Piggins, Ashley, Zwicker, William S

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A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules von Zwicker, William S.

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Annick Laruelle Federico Valenciano Voting and Collective Decision Making: Bargaining and Power 2008 Cambridge University Press 184 pages von Zwicker, William S.

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Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano, Voting and Collective Decision Making: Bargaining and Power, Cambridge University Press (2008) 184 pages von Zwicker, William S

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Special Issue on Computational Foundations of Social Choice von Brandt, Felix, Zwicker, William S.

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