Advantages of Unfair Quantum Ground-State Sampling von Zhang, Brian Hu, Wagenbreth, Gene, Martin-Mayor, Victor, Hen, Itay

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Advantages of Unfair Quantum Ground-State Sampling von Brian Hu Zhang, Wagenbreth, Gene, Martin-Mayor, Victor, Hen, Itay

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Exponential Lower Bounds on the Double Oracle Algorithm in Zero-Sum Games von Zhang, Brian Hu, Sandholm, Tuomas

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On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria von Zhang, Brian Hu, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Polynomial-Time Optimal Equilibria with a Mediator in Extensive-Form Games von Zhang, Brian Hu, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Mediator Interpretation and Faster Learning Algorithms for Linear Correlated Equilibria in General Extensive-Form Games von Zhang, Brian Hu, Farina, Gabriele, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Team Correlated Equilibria in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games via Tree Decompositions von Zhang, Brian Hu, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Subgame solving without common knowledge von Zhang, Brian Hu, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Efficient $\Phi$-Regret Minimization with Low-Degree Swap Deviations in Extensive-Form Games von Zhang, Brian Hu, Anagnostides, Ioannis, Farina, Gabriele, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Finding and Certifying (Near-)Optimal Strategies in Black-Box Extensive-Form Games von Zhang, Brian Hu, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Small Nash Equilibrium Certificates in Very Large Games von Zhang, Brian Hu, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Team Belief DAG: Generalizing the Sequence Form to Team Games for Fast Computation of Correlated Team Max-Min Equilibria via Regret Minimization von Zhang, Brian Hu, Farina, Gabriele, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Sparsified Linear Programming for Zero-Sum Equilibrium Finding von Zhang, Brian Hu, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Exponential Lower Bounds on the Double Oracle Algorithm in Zero-Sum Games von Brian Hu Zhang, Sandholm, Tuomas

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On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria von Brian Hu Zhang, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them von Tewolde, Emanuel, Zhang, Brian Hu, Oesterheld, Caspar, Sandholm, Tuomas, Conitzer, Vincent

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Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity von Tewolde, Emanuel, Zhang, Brian Hu, Oesterheld, Caspar, Zampetakis, Manolis, Sandholm, Tuomas, Goldberg, Paul W, Conitzer, Vincent

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A Lower Bound on Swap Regret in Extensive-Form Games von Daskalakis, Constantinos, Farina, Gabriele, Golowich, Noah, Sandholm, Tuomas, Zhang, Brian Hu

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Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation von Carminati, Luca, Zhang, Brian Hu, Farina, Gabriele, Gatti, Nicola, Sandholm, Tuomas

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Mediator Interpretation and Faster Learning Algorithms for Linear Correlated Equilibria in General Extensive-Form Games von Brian Hu Zhang, Farina, Gabriele, Sandholm, Tuomas

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