Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias von Johari, Ramesh, Li, Hannah, Liskovich, Inessa, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext

Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure von Adlakha, Sachin, Johari, Ramesh, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext

Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design von Balseiro, Santiago R., Besbes, Omar, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext

Mean Field Equilibrium: Uniqueness, Existence, and Comparative Statics von Light, Bar, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext

The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints von Bergemann, Dirk, Castro, Francisco, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext

Procurement Mechanisms for Assortments of Differentiated Products von Saban, Daniela, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext

A Framework for Dynamic Oligopoly in Concentrated Industries von IFRACH, BAR, WEINTRAUB, GABRIEL Y.

Volltext

The Social Divide of Social Distancing: Shelter-in-Place Behavior in Santiago During the Covid-19 Pandemic von Carranza, Aldo, Goic, Marcel, Lara, Eduardo, Olivares, Marcelo, Weintraub, Gabriel Y., Covarrubia, Julio, Escobedo, Cristian, Jara, Natalia, Basso, Leonardo J.

Volltext

Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms von Weintraub, Gabriel Y., Benkard, C. Lanier, Van Roy, Benjamin

Volltext

Framework Agreements in Procurement: An Auction Model and Design Recommendations von Gur, Yonatan, Lu, Lijian, Weintraub, Gabriel Y

Volltext

Measuring the Performance of Large-Scale Combinatorial Auctions: A Structural Estimation Approach von Kim, Sang Won, Olivares, Marcelo, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment von Balseiro, Santiago R, Besbes, Omar, Weintraub, Gabriel Y

Volltext

Computational Methods for Oblivious Equilibrium von Weintraub, Gabriel Y., Benkard, C. Lanier, Van Roy, Benjamin

Volltext

Combinatorial Auctions for Procurement: An Empirical Study of the Chilean School Meals Auction von Olivares, Marcelo, Weintraub, Gabriel Y., Epstein, Rafael, Yung, Daniel

Volltext

Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion von Johari, Ramesh, Weintraub, Gabriel Y., Van Roy, Benjamin

Volltext

An approximate dynamic programming approach to solving dynamic oligopoly models von Farias, Vivek, Saure, Denis, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext

Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries von Benkard, C. Lanier, Jeziorski, Przemyslaw, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext

Analytics Saves Lives During the COVID-19 Crisis in Chile von Basso, Leonardo J., Goic, Marcel, Olivares, Marcelo, Sauré, Denis, Thraves, Charles, Carranza, Aldo, Weintraub, Gabriel Y., Covarrubia, Julio, Escobedo, Cristian, Jara, Natalia, Moreno, Antonio, Arancibia, Demian, Fuenzalida, Manuel, Uribe, Juan Pablo, Zúñiga, Felipe, Zúñiga, Marcela, O’Ryan, Miguel, Santelices, Emilio, Torres, Juan Pablo, Badal, Magdalena, Bozanic, Mirko, Cancino-Espinoza, Sebastián, Lara, Eduardo, Neira, Ignasi

Volltext

Industry dynamics: Foundations for models with an infinite number of firms von Weintraub, Gabriel Y., Benkard, C. Lanier, Van Roy, Benjamin

Volltext

Investment in Two-Sided Markets and the Net Neutrality Debate von Njoroge, Paul, Ozdaglar, Asuman, Stier-Moses, Nicolás E., Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

Volltext