Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design von Kleinberg, Robert, Weinberg, S. Matthew

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Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly von Arnosti, Nick, Weinberg, S. Matthew

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The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization von Gonczarowski, Yannai A., Weinberg, S. Matthew

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A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer von Babaioff, Moshe, Immorlica, Nicole, Lucier, Brendan, Weinberg, S. Matthew

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Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity von Rubinstein, Aviad, Weinberg, S. Matthew

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A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements von Eden, Alon, Feldman, Michal, Friedler, Ophir, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, Weinberg, S. Matthew

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Optimal item pricing in online combinatorial auctions von Correa, José, Cristi, Andrés, Fielbaum, Andrés, Pollner, Tristan, Weinberg, S. Matthew

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Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information von Azar, Pablo D., Kleinberg, Robert, Weinberg, S. Matthew

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Pricing lotteries von Briest, Patrick, Chawla, Shuchi, Kleinberg, Robert, Weinberg, S. Matthew

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Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints von Daskalakis, Constantinos, Devanur, Nikhil R., Weinberg, S. Matthew

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Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based Mechanisms for all Approximation Guarantees von Qiu, Frederick V, Weinberg, S Matthew

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Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design von Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton, Thomas, Weinberg, S Matthew

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A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design von Cai, Yang, Devanur, Nikhil R., Weinberg, S. Matthew

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Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision von Neyman, Eric, Noarov, Georgy, Weinberg, S Matthew

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Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions von Assadi, Sepehr, Khandeparkar, Hrishikesh, Saxena, Raghuvansh R., Weinberg, S. Matthew

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Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols von Ferreira, Matheus V X, Aadityan Ganesh, Hourigan, Jack, Huh, Hannah, Weinberg, S Matthew, Yu, Catherine

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Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions von Essaidi, Meryem, Ferreira, Matheus V X, Weinberg, S Matthew

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Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness von Ferreira, Matheus V X, Weinberg, S Matthew

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Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake von Ferreira, Matheus V X, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, Weinberg, S Matthew, Yu, Catherine

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Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees von Bahrani, Maryam, Immorlica, Nicole, Mohan, Divyarthi, Weinberg, S Matthew

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