Tax Advisors and Tax Aggressiveness: A Bargaining Model von Elitzur, Ramy, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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The effect of directors’ equity incentives on earnings management von Ronen, Joshua, Tzur, Joseph, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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Incentives for voluntary disclosure von Ronen, Joshua, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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Demand for the truth in principal–agent relationships von Ronen, Joshua, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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Incentives for voluntary disclosure von Ronen, Joshua, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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Legal insider trading, CEO’s incentives, and quality of earnings von Ronen, Joshua, Tzur, Joseph, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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On hoarding in contract theory von Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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Management's reporting strategy and imperfection of the capital market von Tzur, Joseph, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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Microstructure of Firms' Disclosure von Tzur, Joseph, Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari

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Tax Evasion as an Outcome of Organizational Design von Tzur, Joseph, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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On Incentives for an Efficient Flow of Knowledge within Multinationals von Shoham, Amir, Yaari, Varda Lewinstein, Brock, David M

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Incumbent employees’ resistance to implementing privatization policy von Druk-Gal, Bat-Sheva, Yaari, Varda

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On the Tension between Full Revelation and Earnings Management: A Reconsiderastion of the Revelation Principle von Ronen, Tavy, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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The Effect of Voluntary Disclosure and Preemptive Preannouncements on Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC) When Firms Manage Earnings von Ronen, Joshua, Ronen, Tavy, Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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On the tension between full revelation and earnings management: A reconsideration of the revelation principle von Ronen, Tavy, Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari

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The disclosure policy of the firm in an efficient market von Ronen, Joshua, (Lewinstein) Yaari, Varda

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