A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies von Kibris, Özgür, Tapki, Ipek Gürsel

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Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules von Kibris, Ozgur, Tapki, I G

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Revealed incomplete preferences under status-quo bias von Tapki, Ipek Gursel

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Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules von TapkI, Ipek Gürsel, Kıbrıs, Özgür

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Benchmarking Competitive Market Environment Using Market-Based Database von Tapkı, İpek Gürsel

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Qualification problems with an upper bound von Tapki, Ipek Gursel

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Population Monotonicity in Public Good Economies with Single Dipped Preferences von Gursel Tapki, Ipek

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Bargaining with non-anonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules von Kibris, Ozgur, Tapki, Ipek Gursel

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