A Formal Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion von VOLDEN, CRAIG, TING, MICHAEL M., CARPENTER, DANIEL P.

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The Political Economy of Governance Quality von TING, MICHAEL M.

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Institutions and Political Restraint von Invernizzi, Giovanna M., Ting, Michael M.

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Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments von Ansolabehere, Stephen, Snyder, James M., Strauss, Aaron B., Ting, Michael M.

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A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy von Ting, Michael M.

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Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting von Snyder, James M., Ting, Michael M., Ansolabehere, Stephen

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Politics and Administration von Ting, Michael M.

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Bureaucrats and Policies in Equilibrium Administrations von Forand, Jean Guillaume, Ujhelyi, Gergely, Ting, Michael M

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Civil Service and Patronage in Bureaucracies von Huber, John D., Ting, Michael M.

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Turf wars von Herrera, Helios, Reuben, Ernesto, Ting, Michael M.

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A Dynamic Model of Primaries von Slough, Tara, York, Erin A., Ting, Michael M.

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Organizational Capacity von Ting, Michael M.

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After defeat: how governing parties respond to electoral loss von Margalit, Yotam, Slough, Tara, Ting, Michael M.

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Legislatures, Bureaucracies, and Distributive Spending von TING, MICHAEL M.

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Primary Elections and the Provision of Public Goods von Ting, Michael M., Snyder, James M., Hirano, Shigeo

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Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter? von ANSOLABEHERE, STEPHEN, SNYDER, JAMES M., TING, MICHAEL M.

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Whistleblowing von TING, MICHAEL M.

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An Informational Rationale for Political Parties von Snyder, James M., Ting, Michael M.

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Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries von Snyder, Jr, James M., Ting, Michael M.

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Direct and Indirect Representation von Hirano, Shigeo, Ting, Michael M.

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